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ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
EXPERT VERIFICATION MISSION
PRESIDENT ELECTION – FIRST ROUND 2010
FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Invited by the Government of Haiti on December 13, 2010, the OAS Expert Verification
of the Tabulation Mission was requested to assess the practices and procedures used in
tabulating the preliminary results of the November 28, 2010 presidential elections as well
as other factors that had an impact on these results. On Election Day, international and
national observers witnessed a number of problems: disorganization, irregularities as
well as instances of ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters and vandalism of polling
stations. These problems were further exacerbated by the precipitous decision of many
candidates to call for the cancellation of elections, hours before the polls closed. In the
days following Election Day, the OAS-CARICOM Joint Election Observation Mission
received numerous allegations of ballot-box stuffing and alterations to the official result
sheets (“Procès-Verbaux”) of the individual polling stations. By any measure, these were
problematic elections.
In the Tabulation Center, where the Expert Mission focused its efforts, these problems
manifested themselves in two particular ways. Some 1,045 Procès-Verbaux (PVs), 9.3
percent of the total from the 11,181 polling stations, never arrived and were identified as
“missing.” Secondly, although electoral participation ebbed to 22.8 percent, 216 PVs
recorded participation rates of 75 percent and above and 118 PVs reached or exceeded
100 percent.
The critical question facing the Expert Mission was, did the irregularities of November
28 impact the outcome of the presidential elections? After a thorough statistical analysis,
explained in more detail in the body of this report, the Expert Mission has determined
that it cannot support the preliminary results of the presidential elections released on
December 7, 2010. The Expert Mission offers three concrete recommendations for the
immediate term that would mitigate some of the anomalies caused by the more egregious
irregularities and instances of fraud and ensure that the preliminary results better reflect
the will of the people.
Procedure dictates that upon receipt of the PVs, staff in the Tabulation Center reviews the
results through its plastic, transparent cover. If there are no visible signs of alterations,
these results are immediately input separately by two data-entry operators. Initially, the
Tabulation Center visually reviewed those PVs in which a single candidate obtained 225
or more votes. Subsequently, the Tabulation Center lowered that threshold to 150.
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Other significant changes need to be implemented before the second round elections. To
that effect, the Expert Mission strongly recommends that the CEP undertake a number of
improvements prior to the second round:
• An immediate public education program to inform electors where they are
on the voters list and where their polling station is located;
• Replace polling station workers where irregularities were discovered, and
retrain poll workers on the what must be in the sachet, including the PV,
Voters List with CIN numbers, tally sheet and other supporting
documentation;
• Increase the training of security officers to properly document incidents;
and
• Create a more transparent process at the Tabulation center.
The OAS Expert Mission recognizes that these recommendations do not completely
remedy everything that went wrong on November 28. They cannot bring back the lost
votes of those destroyed polling centers. They cannot entice citizens to brave the
potential violence, organizational disarray or even the discouraging words from those
presidential candidates for whom they would have voted. Nevertheless, the Expert
Mission believes that the immediate implementation of these recommendations will at
least partially rectify the consequences of the problems and outright fraud on Election
Day and the above recommendations will begin to restore the confidence of the Haitian
people in their electoral process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
After 17 of the 19 presidential candidates rejected the preliminary results of the first
round presidential elections, published on December 7, 2010,
the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) proposed a review OF the tabulation of the
preliminary results by a commission including Haitian electoral authorities, national and
international observers and representatives from the private sector and the international
community. The presidential candidates and others objected that the electoral code did
not contemplate such a commission and thus, it was not constituted.
On December 13, 2010, President Rene Préval requested that the Organization of
American States (OAS) send two missions, one to verify the tabulation of the preliminary
results of the presidential elections and the other to accompany the “contestation” process
in which political parties and candidates can present challenges to the preliminary results.
The OAS and the Government of Haiti and the CEP signed an Agreement which includes
the Terms of Reference for the two expert missions. The Terms of Agreement are
attached as Appendix I.
Comprised of CIN members, the Expert Verification Mission arrived in Haiti on
December 30, 2010. Its members included people with experience in statistics, voting
results auditing, data analysis, voting results tabulation, information technology, election
organization and election monitoring. The list of the team members and their nationalities
is included as Appendix II.
B. Structure of This Report
This report is organized into five major sections:
1. An evaluation of the practices and procedures of the Tabulation Center (CTV) and
of other factors that had an impact on the preliminary results of the first round
presidential election;
2. A description of the methodologies employed by the Expert Mission regarding
data collection, document custody, and statistical sampling techniques;
3. A set of findings from the data collected and its impact on the first round election
results;
4. A recommendation to the CEP on a course of action to take in its certification of
the first round results based upon the Mission findings; and
5. A set of recommendations to the CEP on policy and procedural improvements
intended to correct the deficiencies of the first round.
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II. METHODOLOGIES
A. Terms of Reference
The scope of the expert verification mission is described in Article 3.a of the Agreement
as follows:
Evaluate, in accordance with the Charter of the OAS, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter and the standards developed and applied thereto by
the GS/OAS for OAS electoral observation missions, the Constitution of
the Republic of Haiti and the electoral law of July 9, 2008, the practices
and procedures implemented during the November 28, 2010 Presidential
elections relating to the vote tabulation and any other factors affecting and
relating to the preliminary results published by the CEP”.
B. General Approach
The Expert Mission initiated its activities in accordance with the following precepts:
• To conduct the verification in a transparent and impartial manner adhering
to the Electoral Law of Haiti as well as internationally accepted electoral and
statistical norms and practices;
• To maintain accountable controls so that the chain of custody in its
inspection of CEP documents is auditable; and
• To examine as many sources of data as possible in developing its
recommendations.
In conducting its activities, the Expert Mission remained cognizant of international
precedents involving electoral verification, certification and, the employment of
statistical modeling in electoral forensics. Cases examples of these electoral precedents
are described in Appendix III. The methodology employed to determine the statistical
sample for the national review of PVs is shown as Appendix IV.
C. Statistical Approach
The Expert Mission drew a national representative sample to begin its work. The sample
served to demonstrate parameters to determine potentially problematic areas, such as
geography, voter participation or individual candidate vote count. The CTV had already
used the latter indicator, specifying 150 as a threshold for review. The use of the
national sample also allowed the mission to become familiar with the contents of the
sachet: the process-verbal, the voters’ list, the tally sheet and the forms to record
irregularities and incidents. Team members were able to view many PVs that conformed
to legal requirements and compare them to the other, problematic ones. Factors included
comparing the vote tallies from the PVs to the tally sheets, confirming that the written
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numbers corresponded to the digits, and verifying the presence of a sufficient number of
CIN numbers in the voter registries.
The Expert team first looked at a small sample of eleven together as a team in order to
achieve minimum consensus about what to consider “irregular” and what to consider
“conforming.” The team drafted a checklist, which has been included as an appendix of
this report. Utilizing the services of a pre-eminent statistician, the Expert Mission
utilized “replicates” to control the workload and maintain representative samples at every
point. (See Appendix IV for more information on “National Statistical Sampling
Methodology.”)
D. Complete Review and Evaluation of PVs
Upon completion of the national sample, the members of the expert team had identified
what constituted the most regularly viewed irregularities that contravened the electoral
code of Haiti, specifically the lack of accurate CIN numbers in the voter registries or the
lack of complementary documentation altogether. The sample also demonstrated that
using parameters of voter participation and individual vote count would be the most
effective in identifying irregularities and fraud.
The Expert Team narrowed its evaluation criteria to the four noted in the Executive
Summary and other sections of this report. Its members reviewed every single Procès-
Verbal with a participation rate of greater than 50 percent and a vote total of at least 150
votes for any single candidate. Every one of the 118 PVs with a participation rate of 100
percent or greater was reviewed. In total, the Expert Mission reviewed 919 Procès-
Verbaux, representing 192,063 votes and 16.9 percent of the total votes processed by the
CTV. The reviews focused on the state of the Proces Verbal, the presence of the Voters
List and the validity of the CIN numbers listed. The members of the team confirmed the
CIN numbers through a barcode scanner.
E. Document Processing and Quality Control Procedures
Teams of two inspected every document contained in the sachet. In nearly all cases,
teams were bi-national with at least one native or fluent French speaker. To ensure chain
of custody, each team member recorded his or her name in the spreadsheet before
recording information based on their inspection of a particular sachet. Other team
members recorded their names when conducting follow-on spot checks and comparisons,
which are described below. When not being reviewed, sensitive election materials were
kept under lock at the CTV with tamper evident seals. The CTV is under guard by
MINUSTAH.
To ensure that each member of the Expert Mission applied the same review criteria, it
first changed the two-member teams after one day. This provided an opportunity for the
team members to compare with one and other how each analyzed the points on the
checklist and to determine the point at which they would deem that the PV on the
checklist did not comply with one of the four criteria. Secondly, the teams entered data
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on previously evaluated sachets and the results would be compared by a third person
independent of the data entry process. Once the information was entered, the PVs were
labeled according to the specific groupings and the team members’ names were recorded
on the packages. Two different members of the Expert Mission conducted spot checks
by randomly pulling PVs from the different groups and teams. They visually inspected
the contents and compared the condition of the sachet to determine the accuracy of the
assessment of the team.
III. ELECTORAL PROCESS TRANSMISSION AND TABULATION SYSTEM
The diagram below presents an overview of the process by which votes are collected from polling
stations and processed for publication.
1. Transport: Once polling officials complete the vote count and record the information on
the Procès-Verbal and other documentation, CEP and MINUSTAH transfer the sachets
Intake Centers and consequently transported to the national Tabulation Center in Port-au-
Prince.
2. Reception: As the PV arrive at the Tabulation Center, an operator records the inventory
utilizing a barcode scanner.
3. Visual Verification: A second operator conducts a visual verification of the PVs
received; if there are no errors the PV is passed on for data entry. If there are potential
irregularities, the PV is sent to Legal Control Unit for further investigation.
4. Data Entry: Two operators independently input the tally of the votes from the PV and
the system compares the information entered by both operators. If the results entered are
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the same, the process continues to the next stage. If the results do not conform the
process is repeated.
5. Verification: An operator verifies that all the legal information enclosed in the PV
conforms according to electoral regulations and that the results correspond to the results
entered.
6. Archival: The PV document is then archived and results are stored in the database.
7. Authorization: The CEP Electoral Management body verifies the results of the PVs,
which are either published or dismissed.
8. Presentation: The results are presented in line via the Internet for consultation and
reporting.
IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The Expert Mission utilized the following sources of information to inform its
verification study.
1. “Sachets,” or packets containing the Procès-Verbaux, from a national sample of
polling stations.
2. Sachets from a sample of potentially irregular but accepted polling stations.
3. Sachets from “mis à l’écart” or disallowed PVs.
4. A sampling of voted ballots from each Bureau Electoral Departmental (BED) and
a comparison of voted ballots with the results recorded in the CTV.
5. A review of the Election Day Call Log from the CEP Emergency Call Centre.
6. A review of Election Day reports from international and domestic election
observation organizations.
7. A review of the Election Day incidents log from the UN peacekeeping mission
(MINUSTAH).
8. An extract from the CTV database of full results by candidate, polling station, and
vote status as counted, “mis à l’écart” or missing.
9. User access logs for the CTV tabulation system.
The Expert Team verified 442 PVs from a national sample representing 71,423 votes and
454 PVs where it applied the criteria for disallowing PVs, which represent 118,478 votes.
Additionally, the Expert Team retrieved 23 ballot boxes from all 10 of the BEDs,
representing 2,162 votes. Team members travelled to the BEDs and brought the bags to
be reviewed in the receiving center where electoral materials were returned on Election
Day. In the presence of CEP authorities, they reviewed the contents of the bags and
conducted a manual count of the ballots. The Expert Mission reviewed a total of 919 PVs
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or 8.2 percent of the total PVs processed by the CTV. This number represented 192,063
votes or 16.9 percent of the total votes processed by the CTV.
Additionally, the user access logs for the CTV tabulation system were reviewed. A
reference analysis was conducted to detect irregularities by implementing cross-
examinations between the tabulation systems logs and the extract of the PV results by
comparing the status of the PVs against result logs. Furthermore, the logs were review to
verify that the first and second data intake operations were completed by different users.
Finally, a review was conducted to verify that the operator quality control was undertaken
by a user uninvolved in the data entry. The review concluded that all user control
policies were followed.
Finally, the Expert Team’s mandate required it conduct interviews with electoral
stakeholder to obtain their insights and opinions about the first round elections. In
fulfilling this mandate, team members met with representatives of the presidential
candidacies of Mr. Martelly, and of the Group of Twelve presidential candidates which is
petitioning a group on the election results. Contact was made with Mrs. Manigat, but the
proposed meeting with her representative never materialized. Team members also met
with representatives of the following civil society organizations – Initiative de la Société
Civile, (ISC), Réseau National de Droit de l’Homme, and the Conseil National
d’Observation des Elections (CNO). These meeting also permitted the Expert Mission to
offer information on its composition, its methodology and on some of its own insights.
V. ELECTORAL VERIFICATION FINDINGS
For the purposes of this Expert Mission, an “electoral irregularity” is defined as the
purposeful or erroneous violation of official electoral procedures resulting in the disputed
validity of voted ballots, electoral documents, or voter eligibility and, as a consequence,
electoral results. Keeping in mind the relevant provisions of the Haitian Electoral Law,
the Expert Mission noted the following kinds of irregularities in its verification process:
1. Missing of PVs, voter lists, and tally sheets from the polling station
sachets.
2. Absence of required signatures on the PVs or the tally sheets.
3. Alterations (an attempt to change the results on the PV) versus corrections,
which did not change results.
4. The absence of written CIN numbers on the voter lists indicating that an
elector had voted.
5. Irregular patterns when recording CIN numbers (e.g. the first few pages
completely full of electors who voted with the remaining pages blank.)
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6. Invalid CIN numbers confirmed by using a bar code scanner linked to the
national voter registry.
7. Disallowed PV sachets to confirm the validity of the quarantine decision
by the Unit for Legal Control (ULC) disallowing those results.
8. PVs recording voter participation rates exceeding 50 percent and at least
150 votes for any single presidential candidate, which were included in the
final vote tally.
9. Missing PV sachets with the results of a number of polling stations.
From the analysis of the information obtained from these sources, the Expert Mission
identified the following tendencies.
1. As the participation rate and total number of votes for the winning
candidate increases, so too does the probability of irregularities and fraud.
2. When compared to the total field of candidates, the irregularities impacted
two candidates in particular. (See table below.)
3. Given that most of the irregularities were found on source documents
coming from polling stations, the Expert must conclude that most of the
irregularities and fraud emanated from the polling stations.
4. At the Tabulation Center, however, the Legal Control Unit’s inconsistent
practices and ambiguous lines of authority contributed to the uncertainties
surrounding the validity of the preliminary results.
In recommending a remedy to correct these irregularities, the Expert Mission identified
four options for consideration:
1. Conduct a new nationwide election.
2. Conduct a new election in certain problematic locations.
3. Conduct a nationwide recount of presidential ballots.
4. Review those PVs in the particularly problematic areas, as identified by voter
participation and vote total for a single candidate, and disallow those that do
not comply to articles 171 and 173.2 of the electoral code of Haiti.
5. Ascertain the impact on the preliminary results, including the placement of
the top two candidates to enter the second round.
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The option to conduct a new national election was ruled out. As it pertains to the
presidential election, which is the scope of the Expert Mission, the irregularities
identified most profoundly affected the candidacies of the first, second and third place
presidential candidates in the first round. The Expert Mission believes that a new
election would involve more contests and candidacies than the evidence warranted.
Furthermore, it would subject the Haitian people to a further lapse in constitutional
governance, impose new campaign expenses, and diverting scarce resources both from
the treasury of the Government of Haiti and international assistance would otherwise be
directed into humanitarian relief, and reconstruction programming.
The Expert Mission has ruled out the option of organizing a presidential election in
selected areas was ruled out for similar reasons. While the variable costs associated with
an election involving fewer voters would be, in principle, less than a nationwide one, the
overhead costs of electoral administration would still be incurred, additional expenses
would still be imposed on domestic and international stakeholders, and the lapse in
constitutional governance would remain the same as in the case of a national election re-
poll.
The Expert Mission does not consider a nationwide recount of presidential ballots as a
feasible option. The Electoral Law of Haiti does not have explicit provisions to conduct a
physical recount of ballots. According to Haitian legislation, the PVs serve as the final
accounting of election results and the basis for any recalculation of the preliminary
outcomes.
The Expert Mission proceeded on the option of verifying the preliminary results by way
of the visual verification of a large number of PVs in order to determine whether the
preliminary results reflected the will of the people.
In accordance with this provision of the law, the Expert Mission set four specific criteria
to determine if a PV should be included: 1) the inclusion or absence of the required
signatures of the polling officials on the Procès-Verbaux; 2) the inclusion or absence of
the list of registered voters; 3) the presence or accuracy of the CIN numbers to identify
those voters who cast their ballots at that particular polling station and if bona fide; 4) if
a Procès-Verbal had been obviously altered to change the results of the elections, for
instance adding a digit to a number to increase a vote total by a hundred or more, that PV
was also excluded.
Following the original “red flag” utilized by the ULC in the Tabulation Center, the
Expert Mission reviewed those PVs where any single candidate received more than 150
votes or more. Because of the statistically significant patterns demonstrated in the
national sample, it reviewed and evaluated all PVs with a participation of 50 percent and
above and the previously mentioned candidate total. Every single one of the PVs with a
participation rate that exceeded 100 percent was reviewed, irrespective of the candidate
vote total. Any other PV that was found to not be in compliance with the above criteria,
even if it didn’t reach the thresholds for participation and candidate vote total, was also
recommended to be disallowed and not included in the final vote tally.
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The Expert Mission focused its efforts and activities in the Vote Tabulation Center (CTV,
by its French acronym). Its two chief deficiencies concerned the lack of clear criteria for
determining the validity of the Proces-Verbal and its complementary documentation. To
this end, the Expert Mission provides the following recommendations.
1. The Legal Review Unit should continue using the four specific criteria to
determine if a PV should be included: 1) the inclusion or absence of the required
signatures of the polling officials on the ; 2) the inclusion or absence of the list of
registered voters; 3) the presence and accuracy of the CIN numbers to identify
those voters who cast their ballots at that particular polling station; 4) if a Procès-
Verbal had been obviously altered to change the results of the elections, for
instance adding a digit to a number to increase a vote total by a hundred or more,
that PV was also excluded.
2. A clear chain of authority should be established regarding those PVs, which after
the first review, remain in doubt as to their validity. This authority should include
Haitian lawyers with particular knowledge of the electoral law of the country.
3. Additional recommendations should include:
a. The CTV should formalize the Manual of Operations and have it approved
by the CEP thereby giving it a statutory base. This manual would improve
the quality control measures through greater consistency, uniformity and
thoroughness in the application of the verification criteria. |Likewise, it
would improve the organization of the chain of visual verification process
with measures to isolate the results sheets being worked on from those
already verified and those awaiting verification.
b. The CTV should be provided with sufficient resources to open each sachet
and check for the statutory presence of PVs and tally sheets. Without such
documents, the PVs should be disallowed for further investigation by the
ULC.
c. The CTV should employ scanners to create an electronic log of the PVs
received. By creating PDF copies, the PV can be posted on the CEP web
site for public inspection and transmitted electronically when required. By
initiating the scanning capability at the Tabulation Center, the basic
technology will be put into place which could then be expanded
downward to BEDs, BECs, and even polling stations in future elections.
d. The resources for the Tabulation should be expanded so that the PV
tabulation completion time can be reduced from its current seven days.
e. International and domestic election monitors should be permitted to
observe all of the activities of the CTV including the intake of sachets,
initial inspection procedures, and the organization of PV for tabulation.
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Unit for Legal Control (ULC)
1. Strengthen the training provided to the ULC lawyers, in particular with regard to
the voting and tabulation processes.
2. A mechanism of accountability for the work being performed by the lawyers
should be put in place in order to ensure a quality control of the legal verification
of irregular PVs.
3. Information on PVs verified, even if they were not set aside, should be made
public.
4. Provide a larger cadre of trained lawyers in order to increase the volume of visual
verification undertaken.
5. The ULC attorneys should be provided with improved office facilities and
equipment to facilitate better document control, processing, and organization.
Conseil Electoral Provisiore
1. The CEP should expand the incoming call capacity of the Emergency Call Center
so that security responses to intimidation, threats, and attacks at polling stations
can be effectively organized.
2. For improved ballot control and accountability, the CEP should print ballots with
numbered counterfoils. This procedure should allow poll workers to reconcile
ballots cast with voter turnout enhancing the integrity of the tabulation figures on
the PVs.
3. The CEP should improve the format of the PV form to reflect the following
changes:
• The official copy of the form should not be white as this copy is easier to
fraudulently reproduce;
• The total votes from all the candidates should be placed at the bottom of
the of the tally column;
• The form should contain space for the signature of all polling staff,
mandataires, and observers.
International Community
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1. The number of international observers should be increased for the second round
and deployed in greater numbers at the polls where irregularities were identified
in the first round as a deterrent to fraud.
2. The Verification Mission has identified polling locations where violence occurred
and voting was disrupted. Such patterns of electoral violence provide the
international community with a map of “hot spot” locations where the probability
of a repetition of such violence exists. Therefore, in these areas where polling
stations are designated as “hot spots,” the international observe presence can be
more robust and the presence of MINUSTAH forces can be reinforced.
CONCLUSION
The 2010 presidential election was the fourth conducted since the adoption of the Haitian
constitution in 1987. While this Verification Mission has identified significant
irregularities, which it believes influenced the outcome of the first round of elections,
there are aspects of the electoral process to inspire confidence.
1. There were 19 candidates contesting for the presidency, demonstrating an active
and robust support for elections as the instrument to determine executive
governance.
2. The electoral process engaged 33,543 Haitians as poll workers, demonstrating a
deep sense of civic responsibility and pride among the electorate.
3. The election was monitored by around 6,000 national observers, demonstrating a
commitment on the part of Haitian civil society to demand accountability of its
election officials and processes.
4. Haitians have historically respected the official results of the election,
demonstrating a commitment to democratic principles and rule of law.
Electoral processes in all countries undergo reform and improvements. The Haitian
electorate should regard the 2010 first round as another step in the democratic
development of the country as it seeks to fulfill the constitutional principle of a “socially
just, economically free, and politically independent Haitian nation.”
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Appendix I – Electoral Verification Mission Agreement and Terms of Reference
DRAFT December 27, 2010 at 15 H 30
AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI AND
The Provisional Electoral Council
THE MISSION OF EXPERTS
THE JOINT ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
THE SECRETARY General of the Organization of American States (“GS / OAS), the
Government of the Republic of Haiti and the Provisional Electoral Council (” PRC “),
Parties to this Agreement,
CONSIDERING:
That August 4, 2010, the GS / OAS and the Government of the Republic of Haiti signed
an agreement concerning the observation of elections on 28 November and a second
tower that could ensue, if any, Haiti (“P & I Agreement”), and November 9, 2010, GS /
OAS and the PRC agreed to an agreement on these elections (“Agreement observation”);
That to accomplish their duties under these Agreements, October 22, 2010, GS / OAS
and Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”) signed the cooperation agreement by which
they created the Joint Electoral Observation Mission ( “MOEC);
That December 13, 2010, the President of the Republic of Haiti, His Excellency Rene
Preval, has asked the OAS to send an expert mission to support the verification of the
tabulation of votes and legal technical assistance to the litigation stage of the electoral
process;
That the President of the Republic of Haiti and the Secretary General of the OAS, Mr.
José Miguel Insulza, agreed that the OAS will send a mission to Haiti (the “Mission”) on
the terms set forth below,
DECIDED:
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1. That the P & I Agreement and the Agreement of observation must both remain in
force under the conditions they contain, and that this Agreement shall be
interpreted consistently with these agreements.
2. That the Mission will be composed of experts in law, statistics, voting technology
and information technology (“CSI”), selected by the OAS General Secretariat in
consultation with CARICOM. As members of the MOEC, the Experts will enjoy
all the privileges and immunities granted to members of MOEC under P & I
Agreement and the Agreement of observation.
3. The objectives of the Mission are:
4.
a. Evaluate practices and procedures during the presidential elections of 28
November 2010 on the tabulation of votes and other factors affecting it
and relation to preliminary results released by the PRC, in light of the
Charter of the OAS , the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the
norms established and applied in this matter by the GS / OAS electoral
observation missions of the OAS, as well as the Constitution of the
Republic of Haiti and the Elections Act July 9, 2008;
b. Attend meetings of the National Electoral Office of Litigation (“BCEN”)
for the presidential election and make the appropriate observations and
recommendations;
c. Provide technical assistance to the PRC legal, at the request of the latter,
to the litigation stage of the electoral process;
d. Return to the Government of the Republic of Haiti, a report (the “Report”)
and immediately discussed with the Government of Haiti. The report will
address the findings of the Mission in accordance with paragraphs 3, 3b
and 3c above, including, without limitation, the findings concerning the
evaluation of the tabulation process and the electoral disputes of same as
the corresponding recommendations;
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e. After delivering the report to the Government of the Republic of Haiti,
and after discussing it with him in accordance with paragraph 3 above,
publish and / or publicly comment on the report and any other comment or
recommendation that the Mission deems relevant and it is understood that
neither the mission nor any party to this Agreement shall publish or
publicly comment on the work of the Mission until the report has not been
delivered to the Government of Haiti and that the Mission will not
discussed with him pursuant to paragraph 3 d;
f. Through the MOEC and following the practice of electoral observation
missions of the OAS, a copy of the report and any other comment or
recommendation to the Permanent Council of the OAS;
g. Help increase the confidence of the Haitian people in the final outcome of
the election of November 28, 2010.
1. That to achieve its objectives, the Mission must do the following:
a. Examine the sheets containing the results or minutes (“PV”) polls and other
election documents that the Mission deems relevant;
b. Conduct interviews with leaders of political parties, presidential candidates,
leaders of nongovernmental organizations who participated in the process of
election observation as well as other important stakeholders in the process, chosen
by the Mission ;
c. Ask the PRC Government and any assistance it deems necessary to investigate.
5. Ensure that the PRC Mission to the unlimited access to everyone and
provide all documents, all assistance and all information deemed useful to
achieve its objectives, including but not limited to:
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a. All PV originals, including those who have been rejected for the preliminary
results, the partial list of electors, the tally sheets from polling / counting, and
reporting of irregularities of each polling station;
b. All original documents relating to actions undertaken by the candidates at the
offices of electoral disputes;
c. An analysis of results and decisions of BCEN to monitor the implementation of
standards;
d. A statistical analysis of all results to look for abnormalities in these results,
including breakdowns for specific statistics requested by the Mission;
e. All comparisons of PV voter partial;
f. All the minutes set aside and supporting documents (register of electors / partial
lists, tally sheets from polling / counting and PV irregularities and incidents),
including access to records offices vote was not passed on election day;
g. Unlimited access to experts in the vote tabulation center (“CTV”) and BCEN
meetings and any other person having knowledge of the electoral process;
h. A comparative review of the minutes and supporting documentation for each
polling station in the conduct of the litigation stage of the electoral process.
6. That the PRC will do everything in its power to receive all the candidates
who want their carbon copy of the minutes, if available, the polling
stations as part of protests lodged with the offices of the electoral dispute.
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21
SIGNED by the duly appointed representatives of the Parties, in triplicate, dates and
locations listed below:
GS / OAS GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI
________________________ _______________________
Title
Date
Venue Location
PROVISIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL (POC)
______________________
Title
Date
Location
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22
Appendix II – OAS Electoral Verification Team Roster
Electoral and Topical Experts
Marie-Violette Cesar Elections France
Ms. Cesar served as the Team Leader for the European Commission’s Electoral Expert
Mission in Haiti for the 2010 general elections. In this capacity, she was responsible for
the coordination of all expert activities, liaison with other observer organizations, and the
Mission’s output. She has also served the European Commission as an electoral expert in
Chad, Burundi, and Iraq. She was worked as a consultant for the International IDEA and
European Union NEEDS program on election observation planning and training pilot
program for the African Union.
Robert Donovan Data Analysis United States
Mr. Donovan has served as a member Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe Observation and Supervision missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998, 2000),
Kosovo (2001), Macedonia (2002), and Republic of Georgia (2003, 2003, 2004). Since
2004, he has designed and managed incident reporting and tracking technologies for
domestic election monitoring activities in the United States and regularly provides expert
testimony to state and local government evaluating the conduct of elections. He is fluent
in French.
Marguerite Garcia (France)
Ms. Garcia has served as a member of MICIVIH in 1995 in Haiti observing local,
legislative, and presidential elections. She has served as a long-term electoral observer for
the European Union in Mexico (2006), Nigeria (2007), Ecuador (2008), Bolivia (2008),
Burundi (2010), and Haiti (2006). She returned to Haiti in 2010 with the OAS as an
election observer. She served on the National Commission for Political Party Finance
which examined the contributions and expenditures of political parties during campaign
(2008).
Jeff Fischer (United States)
Mr. Fischer served as a consultant to the first CEP for the 1987 elections and
subsequently the 1990 election in Haiti. He has directed electoral processes in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1996), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (2000). Mr. Fischer has been a
Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University on Elections in Fragile States and an Assistant
Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University on International Electoral Policy and
Practice.
Martin Nadon (Canada)
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Mr. Nadon currently serves as the Chief Technical Advisor for the Electoral Assistance
Project of the United Nations Development Programme in Burundi. He has previously
served as Chief Electoral Advisor for United Nations electoral assistance projects in Mali
and Comoros. His other international electoral assistance experience includes Niger,
Togo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Canada, Mr. Nadon has served as an
advisor for Elections Canada and Elections Quebec.
Fritz Scheuren, PhD (United States)
Dr. Scheuren is a statistician and graduate of the University of Chicago. He currently
serves as the 100th president of the American Statistical Association. Dr. Scheuren has
authored books on elections and data quality.
Danville Walker (Jamaica)
The Honourable Danville Walker was conferred with the 4th highest honour, the Order of
Jamaica, for his outstanding contribution to the Public Service in October 2008. He
successfully conducted seven (7) elections and served on several Electoral Observer
Missions (Chief of Mission on three occasions) as Director of Elections at the Electoral
Office of Jamaica (EOJ).
Organization of American States
Ambassador Colin Granderson Chief of Mission
Joint Election Observation Mission
Trinidad and Tobago
Pablo Gutierrez Director
Department for Electoral Coordination and
Observation
Chile
Steve Griner Head of Electoral Observation
Department for Electoral Coordination and
Observation
United States
Jean-Francois Ruel General Coordinator
Joint Election Observation Mission
Canada
Micaela Martinet Political Analyst
Joint Election Observation Mission
Bolivia
Alex Bravo Senior IT Specialist
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24
OAS Secretariat
United States
David Alvarez Senior Analyst
OAS Secretariat Chile
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25
Appendix III – Electoral Verification and Certification Precedents
Electoral Verification
Through a UN resolution, the government remains responsible for the organization and
conduct of the elections. United Nations verification missions have no legally binding
power but are mandated to observe and verify the legitimacy of the various stages of the
electoral process and the compliance of the national electoral authorities with election
regulations. Examples of verification missions include Nicaragua (ONUVEN), Haiti
(ONUVEH), Angola (UNAVEM II), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Eritrea (UNOVER),
Mozambique (UNOMOZ), South Africa (UNOMAS) and Liberia (UNOMIL).
Electoral Certification
The UN has conducted “certification” missions which have been defined mandated in
different ways. Certification was conduct in of East Timor, Cote D’Ivoire, and Timor-
Leste. For the Popular Consultation in East Timor, the Electoral Commission, established
by the May 5, 1999 agreement, did not have administrative authority, rather it had
certification authority. The three-person commission issued non-binding approvals for
the conduct of voter registration, the campaign, and the balloting.
In Cote D’Ivoire, SCR 1603 established the High Representative for Elections (HRE), an
unprecedented post in UN electoral interventions. This position was established to fulfill
terms of the April 2005 Pretoria Agreement for the HRE to “verify, on behalf of the
international community, all the stages of the electoral process.” However, in the later
2006 SCR 1721, the mandate was amended to read “shall certify that all stages of the
electoral process, including the process of identification of the population, the
establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters’ cards, and provide all
necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and
legislative elections in accordance with international standards.” However, differences
continued regarding the HRE role and, in the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March
2007, it was agreed that the SRSG would certify the election and the HRE’s mandate was
terminated.
In Timor-Leste, the UN Secretariat proposed that the UN continue to play a role in
Timorese elections given the fragility of the political and security environment there in
2006. The Secretary-General proposed a certification mechanism for the parliamentary
and presidential elections scheduled for 2007, “The best alternative way to afford strong
guarantees of the integrity of the electoral process would be through a United Nations
‘certification’ of the electoral process.”
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26
Appendix IV – National Statistical Sampling Methodology
As part of the Review of the Haiti Election, a frame of all the election voting locations in
the country (N=11,181) was obtained. The frame was geographically sorted with voting
locations being at the lowest level, up through Department, the highest level.
To start off the process a small sample (of k =11) voting locations was examined.
Procedures were set up and tested in the pilot, tested and documented, then a second
larger sample was chosen ( n = 300+) from the remaining cases for review.
The total sample size was set by how labor intensive and time consuming the new
reviews might be. Two considerations bear:
If there is no nonsampling error, or in our terms here, no election irregularities, the
sample would have to be large enough to statistically significantly distinguish between
the second and third candidates.
If there was evidence of nonsampling error, then the issue of sample size does not arise
with the same force, since we added special samples in the presence of nonsampling
error.
Throughout the process, the interpenetrating sample ideas of Mahalanobis was employed
and so the work was batched in replicates that would allow timely processing and
verification of sampling and nonsampling ideas at the same time. The use of replicates
(small subsamples) was employed to control the workload and, at the same time, to have
representative samples at every point, so if the reviews were terminated early the results
would still be representative.
In particular, suppose the work was designed to be done in 6 subsamples (replicates, r=6)
of size m =50. This would mean that the overall sample would 311, obtained by
n = k + rm
Some of the selected locations were missing, about 9%, so for these we had to develop a
separate estimation procedure.
This initial stratified sample of 300 was set by how labor intensive and time consuming
the expert reviews might be. Two considerations were central to the approach. If there
were no nonsampling errors or no election irregularities, the sample would have to be
large enough to statistically significantly distinguish (validate the difference) between the
second and third candidates, since only the top two could go on to the run-off. This test
was performed and we were able to conclude that even at n=311 the sample was
sufficient.
From the initial sample (and other information), there was evidence of large nonsampling
errors (election irregularities); thus, the issue of a still larger initial sample size does not
DRAFT
26
Appendix IV – National Statistical Sampling Methodology
As part of the Review of the Haiti Election, a frame of all the election voting locations in
the country (N=11,181) was obtained. The frame was geographically sorted with voting
locations being at the lowest level, up through Department, the highest level.
To start off the process a small sample (of k =11) voting locations was examined.
Procedures were set up and tested in the pilot, tested and documented, then a second
larger sample was chosen ( n = 300+) from the remaining cases for review.
The total sample size was set by how labor intensive and time consuming the new
reviews might be. Two considerations bear:
If there is no nonsampling error, or in our terms here, no election irregularities, the
sample would have to be large enough to statistically significantly distinguish between
the second and third candidates.
If there was evidence of nonsampling error, then the issue of sample size does not arise
with the same force, since we added special samples in the presence of nonsampling
error.
Throughout the process, the interpenetrating sample ideas of Mahalanobis was employed
and so the work was batched in replicates that would allow timely processing and
verification of sampling and nonsampling ideas at the same time. The use of replicates
(small subsamples) was employed to control the workload and, at the same time, to have
representative samples at every point, so if the reviews were terminated early the results
would still be representative.
In particular, suppose the work was designed to be done in 6 subsamples (replicates, r=6)
of size m =50. This would mean that the overall sample would 311, obtained by
n = k + rm
Some of the selected locations were missing, about 9%, so for these we had to develop a
separate estimation procedure.
This initial stratified sample of 300 was set by how labor intensive and time consuming
the expert reviews might be. Two considerations were central to the approach. If there
were no nonsampling errors or no election irregularities, the sample would have to be
large enough to statistically significantly distinguish (validate the difference) between the
second and third candidates, since only the top two could go on to the run-off. This test
was performed and we were able to conclude that even at n=311 the sample was
sufficient.
From the initial sample (and other information), there was evidence of large nonsampling
errors (election irregularities); thus, the issue of a still larger initial sample size does not
DRAFT
27
arise. Instead, additional special samples were added. In the end, the analysis was no
longer based only on the initial sample of 300 but was based on reviews of n = 919
election sites, plus extensive tallies from the available Election Commission data.
There were a number of forensically special aimed samples to explore further the
hypotheses that came from the Expert Team’s initial 311 sample reviews.
The Expert Team also consulted with the other election observers and used those
conversations to confirm our approach or to follow up on specific instances or
suggestions about possible problems.
To check the work we also instituted two internal quality procedures. The review teams
(or two) internally reviewed their own procedures (in the language of quality they put
themselves under self-control. Self-control is a form of producer quality). Through
management reviews, an external (Consumer) quality measure was provided.
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29
The map shown above shows total counted votes by Department. The data by necessity
come only for locations reporting votes. The largest number of votes counted was in the
Ouest Department, which contains Port-a-Prince.
The second map of Haiti is the percent of voting locations reporting. There were 11,181
voting locations overall for the 2010 Presidential contest in Haiti. About 91% of them or
10,136 turned in voting packets for the presidential contest. There was some clumping of
missing locations, with larger than average percents of unreported voting locations in
Artibonite and Nord.
Haiti –Percent of Reported Votes
Grand’Anse
6 % Nippes
6 %
Nord-Ouest
7 %
Sud-Est
6 %
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30
Haiti
–Percent
PV’s
of
Quarantined
Grand’Anse
2% Nippes
1 %
Nord-Ouest
3 %
Sud-Est
11 %
Haiti
–Percent
of
Votes
with
Irregularities
Grand’Anse
2% Nippes
1 %
Sud-Est
10 %
