Posted: 16 October 2024| Region: Latin America and the Caribbean | Category: Analysis
Author: Sandra Pellegrini
On 22 September 2023, amid escalating gang violence and intense rivalries, several gang leaders unexpectedly announced the formation of a new alliance called Viv Ansanm.1 This coalition, which brought together the main gang factions operating in Port-au-Prince — G-9 and G-Pèp — pledged to protect civilians and called on the population living in gang-controlled neighborhoods to resume their daily activities, which are often disrupted by gang conflicts. The coalition faced skepticism at its inception, as many doubted its durability due to long-standing rivalries and differences among its members. However, the coordinated Viv Ansanm incursions launched on state institutions on 29 February, which aimed to force Prime Minister Ariel Henry to resign, marked a turning point and demonstrated the coalition’s ability to adapt, negotiate, and work cohesively toward shared goals. This series of attacks led to Henry announcing on 11 March that he would resign. It showcased Viv Ansanm’s capacity to act as a unified front as violence persisted in the subsequent months. Furthermore, the attacks came amid advanced negotiations on the deployment of the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, created to stabilize the country’s security. Gangs have perceived the MSS mission as an emerging threat, prompting them to join forces and adapt their operations in the lead-up to the troops’ deployment.
A year after going public, the Viv Ansanm alliance has altered Haiti’s conflict landscape. The truce among previously warring gangs has led to a notable decrease in fighting, especially after the alliance consolidated with the February incursions. This allowed them to concentrate on revenue-generating activities, widen their reach to a larger number of areas, and counter security operations.
This report analyzes how the formation of the Viv Ansanm coalition has reshaped Haiti’s gang landscape. It explores the strategic advantages the alliance has provided member gangs — such as the ability to expand their presence to new areas and increase their targeting of state infrastructure — and examines the challenges that threaten the coalition’s stability and longevity, as well as the persistent threat gangs pose to civilians.
A truce in gang wars
Gang leaders’ announcement that they would be rallying under the Viv Ansanm flag marked a strategic shift and came amid a sharp increase in gang clashes. Between 2021 and 2022, violence between gangs increased by 79%, with over 500 reported fatalities in 2022 — a figure that remained at a high level throughout the following year. Despite this volatile backdrop, the formation of Viv Ansanm signaled the beginning of a truce between the rival factions that aimed to reduce hostilities and consolidate power among the gangs.
Initially, Viv Ansanm appeared fragile, with gang clashes continuing after the alliance went public in late 2023. It was only after the success of its coordinated attacks on 29 February 2024, which targeted public institutions and prisons across the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, that gangs began putting their rivalries aside. The attacks were aimed at destabilizing the transitional government led by interim Prime Minister Ariel Henry and resulted in the announcement of his resignation on 11 March.2 Since these coordinated actions, armed clashes between gangs have significantly decreased, falling by 78% between March and August 2024 compared to the previous six months, with reported fatalities dropping significantly (see graph below).3
The decrease in clashes between gangs, however, does not mean that gangs reduced their activities. On the contrary, it enabled gangs to widen their reach within the capital and Ouest department instead of investing resources in fighting their rivals.
An alliance enabling wider influence
Haiti administrative divisions
Historically, gang activity in Haiti has been concentrated in the Ouest region, particularly within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Taking advantage of ongoing political instability, gangs have steadily expanded territorial control.4 In 2021, ACLED records violent gang activity in nearly 70 neighborhoods of the Port-au-Prince arrondissement, a figure that has experienced a steady year-on-year increase. The consolidation of the Viv Ansanm alliance has enabled gangs to focus their resources on criminal activities and confrontations with security forces, rather than engaging in infighting. This shift has also allowed them to extend their operations across a broader range of neighborhoods. Between March and August 2024, gang violence occurred in nearly 100 neighborhoods across the Port-au-Prince arrondissement, representing a 20% increase compared to the previous six months, when violent gang activity took place in at least 80 neighborhoods.
Within the Port-au-Prince commune, although violence has not spread to a larger number of areas, gang activity hotspots have relocated. Between September and February, violence clustered in areas contested by rival gangs such as the Carrefour Feuilles, La Saline, and Portail Léogâne, whereas since March, violence has shifted to the city’s center and its surrounding neighborhoods — Champs de Mars, Centre Ville, Bas Peu de Choses, Fort National, and Bois Verna — where gangs have notably challenged the state and targeted public and security buildings (see maps below).
Despite these shifts, the neighborhood of Solino remains a battleground and key target for gangs, who are vying for control of this strategic area to facilitate kidnappings. Violence in Solino has also spilled over into the neighboring commune of Delmas, where the number of neighborhoods affected by gang violence has nearly doubled since March compared to the previous six months, particularly around Carrefour Aéroport — a strategic road axis crucial to gang activity and territorial control.
The February attacks further spurred gang activity in the Pétion-Ville and Tabarre communes. However, a notable development is the increasing number of gang incursions into the capital’s outskirts, which have tested security forces’ capacity to respond. This is particularly evident in Carrefour, where gangs seek control of the National Road 2 connecting the capital with the southwestern part of Haiti, and further west, in the commune of Gressier, which saw a surge in violence in May ahead of the anticipated MSS mission deployment. This pattern extends across the broader metropolitan area and the Ouest region. In Croix-des-Bouquets, gangs, particularly 400 Mawozo, have effectively taken control of the roads connecting with the north of the country. Their activities along the border with the Dominican Republic, including the takeover of a police station in Ganthier and a customs office, have intensified.
Outside the Ouest region, gang activity has not expanded significantly since February. Nevertheless, a surge in violence across multiple departments between 2022 and 2023, linked to heightened gang activity and responses from state forces and vigilante groups, warrants close attention. The Artibonite region holds particular strategic importance for gangs who target agricultural assets to diversify their revenue, threatening the country’s food security and its transportation routes, which facilitate the extortion of civilians.5 For several years, gang violence in this department has impacted a growing number of areas, particularly along major roads, with frequent deadly attacks on civilians. Most recently, on 3 October, the Gran Grif gang killed at least 115 people in Pont Sondé,the deadliest event in the region since 2018, allegedly in retaliation for civilians allying with a local self-defense group and refusing to pay an extortion fee.6
As a significant transit corridor, the Centre department has also become an increasing focus of gang activity, with incidents more than doubling in 2023 compared to the previous year (see graph below). In the same vein, attacks at sea multiplied in 2023, and 2024 has already seen a higher number than in the previous year. Gangs’ increased control over the Haitian coastline and territorial waters allows them to dominate trafficking routes and generate revenue by targeting boats and cargo vessels transporting goods. It also serves as a strategic means to facilitate the movement of armed members,7 enabling faster connections between the capital and other regions. While the dynamics are still evolving, it remains essential to monitor the potential growth of rural gangs and the activities of Port-au-Prince-based gangs, who may be seeking to establish footholds outside the capital, both to diversify their revenue streams and secure potential refuge in the face of intensifying anti-gang operations.
Escalating political violence sustains risks for civilians
Although they initially operated with established links to local and national political forces, gangs have grown increasingly independent from their political sponsors. This shift became particularly pronounced after the assassination of Former President Jovenel Moïse on 7 July 2021, with gangs positioning themselves as fierce opponents of the transitional government led by Henry. As gangs became more confrontational toward authorities, there has been a steady increase in attacks on government and public infrastructure, as well as on officials.
Strategic action toward destabilizing the government intensified following the formation of the Viv Ansanm alliance. Between March and August 2024, ACLED records at least 48 violent incidents targeting police stations and government buildings, compared to 16 incidents in the previous six months (see graph below). Notably, gangs targeted the National Palace to disrupt the installation of the new transitional authorities in April.8 In May, these incidents spiked as gangs sought to prevent the deployment of the MSS by destroying facilities likely to be earmarked for security forces.
Despite the escalation in political violence, the truce among gangs has led to a 16% decrease in direct attacks on civilians perpetrated by gangs. This decline is particularly evident in areas where gang rivalries have diminished. For instance, unlike in other areas of the capital, violence has not spread across a higher number of neighborhoods in Cité Soleil commune, and violent incidents targeting civilians have decreased, likely as a result of the ceasefire between four rival gangs signed at the end of July 2024 alongside the Viv Ansanm agreement.9
A representative of the Organisation de Défense et de Promotion des Droits de l’Homme (ORDEDH) further noted that many civilians have fled gang-controlled territories due to violence and the burning of homes, thus reducing their exposure to gang violence. He also stressed that gang leaders have increasingly portrayed themselves as benevolent figures within the areas they control to regain the trust of residents.10
However, the decrease in direct attacks on civilians should be viewed in context, as gang-related destruction of civilian property — including homes, public service providers, and infrastructure — indicates that overall levels of violence have remained largely unchanged. Civilians remain at risk, with 2.7 million people exposed to gang activity between March and August 2024. Moreover, the civilian population continues to suffer due to gangs’ revenue-generating activities. Kidnappings for ransom have remained a daily reality for Haitians, with a notable surge in July 2024, which likely reflects gangs consolidating resources to withstand security operations after Kenyan police officers from the MSS deployed in June and July. Gang extortion practices along roadways and within their criminal governance of territories significantly impact the daily lives of civilians, forcing them to relocate and threatening their most basic needs. In August, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that over 580,000 people were displaced, with women and girls at alarming risk of sexual and gender-based violence.11 Additionally, 5 million Haitians face food insecurity, largely due to gangs’ expansion in Artibonite region and their control over agricultural resources.12
Enduring alliances in the face of a shared threat
While alliances and ceasefires prompted a reduction in overall violence levels, Haiti’s gang landscape remains highly volatile. Although the frequency of clashes between gangs has significantly decreased, tensions and rivalries can lead to occasional fighting. In August, fighting took place in Brochette, Carrefour, while in September, members of Nan Boston and Simon Pelé’s gangs clashed in Delmas over the alleged result of a football game, although no clashes have appeared significant enough to threaten the alliance thus far.
Changes in gang leadership due to targeted killings could further fracture alliances, as gangs’ leadership structures remain highly personalized and dependent on good relationships among leaders. For instance, the deaths of gang leaders Iskar Andrice and David Ganier, known as ‘Black Alex Mana,’ in November 2023 led to a surge in deadly inter-gang clashes, with rival factions attempting to seize the territories formerly under their control.13
Furthermore, the injection of resources and the first MSS deployments breathed new life into Haiti’s National Police, with clashes between gangs and security forces intensifying and over 100 people killed in July 2024 (see graph below). This intensification of clashes poses not only a threat to the civilian population — amid concerns of extrajudicial executions during security operations — but also highlights the potential for increased violence and instability. Thus far, however, the reinforcement of security capacity with the deployment of the SMM has not led to gang retreats or significant territorial gains or caused fractures in the alliance amid persistent underfunding.14 Amid these mixed results and the expiration of the MSS mandate on 2 October, the UN Security Council voted to extend the mission for an additional year, with gangs expected to maintain a unified response to the ongoing security efforts.
Internal gang dynamics also remain a source of potential conflict. The Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitel’Homme Innocent, has experienced internal disputes caused by delays in paying its members. The dispute resulted in the reported deaths of 63 gang members in Tabarre on 15 January 2024, highlighting how ensuring a constant revenue stream is of vital importance for gangs.
Finally, the possibility of some gangs seeking negotiations with the government adds another layer of uncertainty. Some gangs have publicly expressed openness to negotiations after transitional Prime Minister Garry Conille called on gangs to drop their weapons.15 However, the potential exclusion of some groups or their reluctance to enter into an agreement with the government will likely create fissures within existing alliances. According to some observers, the Viv Ansanm alliance incarnates a paradox itself: While it remains the primary threat to the Haitian state, it also represents the first instance of a unified platform available for engagement and dialogue.16 The strengthening of the Viv Ansanm alliance has fostered greater stability within Haiti’s notoriously volatile gang landscape, resulting in fewer gang-on-gang clashes. However, the consolidation of the alliance has also allowed gangs to tighten their grip on the communities they control, with reports emerging of civilians being executed for allegedly collaborating with state security.
Following the renewal of the MSS mandate on 2 October and mounting international pressure for elections to be held by November 2025, anti-gang operations by Haitian authorities and the MSS are expected to intensify in the coming year, further endangering civilians which may be caught in the crossfire or targeted as part of gang fundraising efforts. Despite the volatile relationships among gang members, Viv Ansanm is likely to endure as long as it faces the shared threat of an international security force.
Visuals produced by Ana Marco and Ciro Murillo.
