E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014

REF: A. PAP 1373
     B. PAP 1027 

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 

1. (C) Summary: Fritz Mevs, a member of one of Haiti's
richest families and a well-connected member of the private
sector elite, told Poloff on May 13 that business leaders are
exasperated by the lack of security in the vital port and
industrial zone areas of Port-au-Prince and are allegedly
arming local police with long-guns and ammunition in an
effort to ensure security for their businesses and employees.
Kidnappings and carjackings are frightening Haiti's small but
critical cadre of mid-level employees who work in the
industrial park and port, and workers have threatened to
strike unless the security situation improves, Mevs said.
(Note: This area is either off-limits or LAV-travel only for
the embassy.  End Note.)  Mevs said that the recent killing
of gang leader Labaniere is part of the problem, as he used
to keep rival gangs out of the area.  Mevs also said private
sector protests against the IGOH for the lack of security
were misguided and called for a media campaign to mobilize
opposition against what he described as the true scourge of
Haiti: a cabal of drug-traffickers, Haitian elite and IGOH
insiders conspiring with gangs and corrupt cops to undermine
peace and democracy in the country. In response to embassy
and private sector prodding, MINUSTAH is now formulating a
plan to protect the area.  End summary. 


2. (C) Fritz Mevs is a prominent member of one of Haiti's
richest families. He leads a group of local investors who own
and operate in Port-au-Prince the Terminal of Varreux (the
private terminal that handles 30% of Haiti's imports), the
petroleum storage of WINECO (which encompasses Haiti's
largest propane gas storage center) and the SHODECOSA
Warehouse Complex (where, among other things, 90% of the
humanitarian cargo donated to Haiti is stored). The Mevs
family has always enjoyed financial control of important
Haitian economic assets and has shown an ability to roll with
(and have influence upon) any government that allows them to
exploit those assets. 

Port Area Suffering from Insecurity

3. (C) Mevs told Poloff on May 13 that the security situation
in and around the port and industrial zone area was
untenable. The district is surrounded by the gang havens of
Bel Air, La Saline and Cite Soleil, and kidnappers and
carjackers target traffic along the vital transport link
(Route Nationale #1) between the port and the Industrial
Park. Mevs said the crime threat has already forced several
businesses to close (including the Embassy's GSO operations),
while employees of others are threatening to strike unless
the security situation improves. Among those Mevs cited as
caught in the midst of the "urban warfare" are: CEMEX, TOTAL,
DINHASA, TEXACO, MADSEN Import-Export, SOGENER, and others.
Mevs said absenteeism among employees is at an all-time high
and the flow of essential commodities (oil, gasoline, cement,
rice, steel, etc.) transiting through the facility is
adversely affected. Continued disruption, he said, will soon
result in shortages, inflation, and potentially a collapse in
support for the transition government.  (Note:  The Director
General of the National Port Authority has separately
confirmed Mevs account of the situation outside of the port.
While security inside the port is acceptable, just outside of
the gates criminals operate freely.  Gunfire is common and
workers fear for their lives going to and from work every
day.  He said MINUSTAH, while present, does not provide any
real security for employees going into or out of the port.
End Note.) 

4. (C) Mevs showed Poloff a pile of letters sent from the
Terminal authority and several of its members to MINUSTAH
SRSG Valdes, Prime Minister Latortue, HNP Director General
Leon Charles, and Minister of Justice Gousse over the last
two months. The letters describe a lengthy list of incidents
and vulnerabilities - including pipeline sabotage, criminal
fires, shots fired at offloading vessels, kidnappings and
murders - and solicit additional, permanent security, often
in quite desperate language ("we may not hold on for long").
The Terminal's large army of security staff are outgunned by
the heavy weapons fired by the bandits, the letters say, and
must stand helplessly at the gate, unable to intervene when
those entering or exiting are hijacked, robbed, shot and at
times, killed, outside the jurisdiction of the Terminal
fences. According to Mevs, although MINUSTAH has on occasion
parked armored vehicles near the Terminal with some success,
he said criminals regularly force the tanks to move (by
burning tires or fecal matter nearby), and as soon as the
vehicles depart, the rampage continues. 

5. (C) Other embassy contacts confirm Mevs' description of
the deteriorated security situation in the port area. A
political advisor to the Mayor of Cite Soleil told PolOff on
May 17 that MINUSTAH was proving to be a poor substitute for
Labaniere, the gang leader from the Boston neighborhood of
Cite Soleil closest to the industrial zone who was killed on
March 30, allegedly in a plot directed by rival pro-Lavalas
gang leader Dread Wilme. The advisor said that Labaniere (who
reportedly received money from businesses in the district for
protection) managed to defend the commercial zone in a way
that periodic MINUSTAH checkpoints have not. He said bandits
were undaunted by UN vehicles sometimes parked along Route
Nationale #1 and that MINUSTAH troops (who, he said, rarely
set foot outside of their vehicles) were unable to identify
the bandits from amongst the general populace as Labaniere
had done. 

6. (C) Meanwhile, a MINUSTAH official told PolOff on May 18
that the Cite Soleil operation begun on March 31 was indeed
weakening due to Brazilian and Jordanian troop rotations that
could last 4-8 weeks. Permanent checkpoints along Route
Nationale and other areas surrounding Cite Soleil have been
replaced by rotating outposts concentrated primarily north of
the commercial district, leaving much of the area described
by Mevs unprotected. Another MINUSTAH commander confirmed on
May 20 that UN troops were drawing down, to be replaced by a
joint HNP-CIVPOL strategy that would effectively block a
critical section of the highway to all vehicular traffic

Embassy Port-au-Prince's Response

7. (C) Charge met with UNSRSG Valdes on May 14 to encourage
him to dramatically increase MINUSTAH's security presence in
the area.  Valdes seemed genuinely surprised that the
situation was so acute.  Following the meeting Charge
encouraged the French ambassador to reiterate our message
with Valdes.  In response Valdes instructed MINUSTAH military
and CIVPOL leaders to develop a plan in coordination with the
private sector, who rejected an initial proposal as
unworkable.  On May 19 Ambassador Foley wrote to Ambassador
Valdes to protest three examples of MINUSTAH passivity in
response to violence against American citizens.  Ambassador
Foley again underscored the need for a swift, aggressive
response to criminal elements in a conversation with Valdes
on May 20.  Valdes thanked the Ambassador for the concrete
examples described in the Ambassador's letter.  He said that
he had often heard reports but never had details with which
he could confront MINUSTAH military and police leaders.
Valdes promised a more robust response from MINUSTAH.
Separately, a MINUSTAH military officer reported to the Core
Group on May 20 that they were preparing to present another
strategy to business representatives on May 21.  Ambassador
Foley warned the Core Group that MINUSTAH's stand-down in
Cite Soleil put the elections at risk, and that the
insecurity around the industrial zone risked undermining what
is left of the Haitian economy. 

Private Sector Arming the Police

8. (C) In response to MINUSTAH's unresponsiveness, Mevs said,
a group of merchants from the Terminal conducted an
unofficial survey of the HNP's weapons inventory and
requirements. The report (on official HNP letterhead
indicating some form of HNP cooperation in the effort)
suggests, for example, that the Port-au-Prince station has
(2) M-14s, (2) T-65s, and (2) M-1s, and needed (6) M-14s, (8)
T-65s, and (4) Galils. (Note: Embassy has not independently
confirmed any of the numbers from the report. End note). The
undated report shows the HNP has the following country-wide
-- (65) 12-guage rifles
-- (11) M-14
-- (15) T-65
-- (15) M-1
-- 82 functioning vehicles
-- 179 radios 

and the following needs: 

-- (200) T-65
-- (127) galils
-- (120) M-14
-- (43) M-1
-- (73) 12-guage rifles
-- 160 vehicles
-- 249 radios 

9. (C) Mevs said some business owners have already begun to
purchase weapons and ammunition from the street and
distribute them to local police officials in exchange for
regular patrols. Mevs claimed, for example, that Reginald
Boulos, President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, had
already distributed arms to the police and had called on
others to do so in order to provide cover to his own actions.
Mevs says that of the roughly 150 business owners in the
area, probably 30 have already provided some kind of direct
assistance (including arms, ammunition, or other materiel) to
the police, and the rest are looking to do so soon. Contacts
of the Econ Counselor report from time to time of discussions
among private sector leaders to fund and arm their own
private sector armies.  The AmCham Board of Directors at one
point discussed informally giving non-lethal assistance to
police stations, such as furniture and microwave ovens for
police stations, but decided against doing so for fear that
anything given to the police would quickly be stolen. 

10. (C) Mevs defended the idea of the private sector arming
the police in general, but he lamented the haphazard manner
in which many of his colleagues seemed to be handing out
weapons with little control. He said they were "wasting their
money" by giving arms to police without knowing if they were
"dirty or clean" and with no measures in place to make sure
the arms were not simply re-sold. He also complained that
funneling the arms secretly would only serve to reinforce
rumors that the elite were creating private armies. Mevs said
he was approaching the Embassy in order to find a way for
these private sector initiatives to be incorporated into
established inventory and control systems within the HNP. He
described his conception of a program in which the private
sector could purchase guns and ammunition on the open market
and turn the equipment over to the HNP in exchange for a
receipt and a guarantee that a certain number of
appropriately-armed HNP would be assigned to a requested
area. He said, however, that he did not trust either MINUSTAH
or the HNP to properly control the issuance of weapons and
hoped that the U.S. would oversee the program. 

Haiti's "new enemy"

11. (C) In response to the May 11 protest (supported by some
private sector leaders such as Charles Baker) to demand that
the IGOH address the security situation, Mevs said their
target was wrong. He said protesters should mobilize against
Haiti's real enemy and the true source of insecurity: a small
nexus of drug-dealers and political insiders that control a
network of dirty cops and gangs that not only were
responsible for committing the kidnappings and murders, but
were also frustrating the efforts of well-meaning government
officials and the international community to confront them.
He asserted, for example, that some incidents were engineered
specifically to frustrate efforts by the IGOH to secure a
weapons export license waiver from the Department of State.
Mevs claimed that Colombian drug-traffickers (and allegedly
the brother of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez) had allied
with a small cabal of powerful and connected individuals,
including Youri Latortue, Gary Lissade, lawyer Andre Pasquet,
Michel Brunache (Chief of Staff to President Alexandre), Jean
Mosanto Petit (aka Toto Borlette, owner of the unofficial
Haitian lottery and large swaths of Port-au-Prince property),
and Dany Toussaint, to create a criminal enterprise that
thrives on - and generates - instability.   (Note: We have no
corroborating information linking Brunache to
drug-trafficking.  He, along with Latortue, Pasquet, and
Justice Minister Gousse. all worked in Gary Lissade's law

12. (C) Mevs suggested that some recent kidnappings
(including that of Dr. Michel Theard - ref B) were actually
targeted crimes meant to send a message to the people within
the IGOH that the network was calling the shots. (Comment:
This obviously contradicts his claim that IGOH insiders are
involved.  End Comment.)  Mevs claimed that Dr. Theard had
been passed between several supposedly independent gangs,
thereby illustrating how the gangs were actually joined
together by a "central node." It was against this network,
Mevs argued, that well-meaning Haitians should direct their
ire, and he called for a mass popular mobilization against
this unnamed (but apparently obvious) cabal: the "new common
enemy following the departure of President Aristide." 


13. (C) Fritz Mevs undoubtedly has a strong personal interest
in convincing us that the port district is in danger and he
is no doubt biased against those individuals he names who
work against his interests. Mevs himself is a core member of
what might easily be described as a rival network of
influence competing for control of Haiti against the cast of
characters he has described. Furthermore, it is impossible to
imagine that Mevs has managed to protect his interests over
the years without making some accommodation with potentially
hostile government principals and the associated gang leaders 

at his doorstep (indeed his silence on Aristide's continuing
role in the violence is curious). While we cannot confirm
whether the alleged cabal of political insiders allied with
South American narco-traffickers is controlling the gangs, we
have seen indications of alliances between drug dealers,
criminal gangs and political forces that could threaten to
make just such a scenario possible via the election of
narco-funded politicians, unless we are able to severely
disrupt the flow of drugs into and out of Haiti.  One thing
is clear: it is vital that our plan to equip the HNP through
strict controls go forward immediately.  In the meantime, we
will deliver strong messages to Charles and the IGOH (and our
private sector contacts) against private delivery of arms to
the HNP.  End Comment. 




E.O. 12958: N/A

REF: 04 PAP 244 

1. (U) Summary: In the year since Aristide's departure,
university student groups and other youth-oriented
organizations have shifted their focus from grassroots
political activism (the "shock-troops" of the anti-Aristide
movement - reftel) and returned for the most part to their
founding principles -- academic reforms, employment, and
socio-economic development. The transition/election process
has also afforded an opportunity for student and youth
organizations to broaden their portfolio to include civic
education, national dialogue and support for the political
process. Student groups, once courageous and united in their
opposition to Aristide, are now divided -- and fearful -- and
represent little threat to the IGOH, despite their
dissatisfaction with it (see septel summary of the divided
student movement). Youth groups in general are bitter that
their efforts to rid Haiti of Aristide have gone unrewarded,
and they bristle at being marginalized from the transition
process. Post is seeking to engage and support those groups
that seek to play a peaceful role in political and social
development. End summary. 

Student support strong for elections; weak for the IGOH
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 

2. (SBU) Students at first praised the transparency of the
IGOH but soon began to criticize the lack of tangible results
and the absence of any engagement with the youth movement.
Students believe that they were responsible for bringing down
Aristide and installing the IGOH and begrudge the IGOH for
ignoring them over the course of the last year. They long for
a consultative role on issues and are frustrated that they
have not received any benefits from the IGOH that they
believe they brought to power. They often say, though with
little conviction, that they could "rise again" at any moment
if the IGOH does not respond to their requests for inclusion. 

3. (SBU) The IGOH's loss of credibility among the students
has damaged student faith in elections as well. One ex-leader
of the CdC told Poloff that the IGOH had proven itself
incapable of organizing anything, and it was only the
international community that gave Haiti an "appearance of a
State" and kept the bandits from taking power. Others claim
the lack of any "new blood" among the politicians has
dampened student enthusiasm. Above all, students are
resentful that they have not been included in elections
preparations efforts, and say they are uniquely qualified,
uncommonly energetic, and ideally placed to help the CEP and
the international community to implement the registration,
civic education and voting process, if only the IGOH and the
UN would let them play a role. 

Students divided, less mobilized

4. (SBU) There were few instances in the past year where
students have taken to the streets in a show of force. For
the most part, students have the same complaints regarding
the IGOH as the population at large (all talk and no action,
lack of transparency and inclusion, inept and ineffective)
but they are more emotional in their hostility. But students
are more divided -- by ideology and interests -- than before
and this discord has hindered action. Many students simply
want to get a job or get out of the country, while their
leaders seek to join Haiti's insular political class. Leaders
often inflate scandals and spark crises in order to attract
press and enter the political conscience. Many old student
leaders try to prevent new leaders from emerging, and rumors
are rife that the IGOH (and specifically Youri Latortue) is
building an "intelligence cell" within the student movement
for political ends. 

5. (SBU) In this estranged environment, most student displays
of force have been confused, small-scale rallies focused on
narrow student interests and/or were staged to enhance the
political image of student leaders: a sit-in at the Primature
that mobilized no more than 50 backers of Saintilus; a hunger
strike at the Faculty of Business that mixed its protest over
the expulsion of a dozen students with a call for the
overthrow of the IGOH; or a shouting match between
private-sector backed GRAFNEH (see septel for group
descriptions) and the more radical Faculty of Social Sciences
on the security situation and role of MINUSTAH. To date, the
primary student and youth groups have voiced their
displeasure with the IGOH mostly in private, and at this
stage are basically resigned to the idea of replacing the
government via fall elections. 

Non-student youth organizations

6. (SBU) The disruption of Aristide's patronage system that
produced bands of "chimere" youth in targeted neighborhoods
had two effects. Without viable alternatives, many of those
who benefited from the handouts reconstituted themselves as
the soldiers of the organized criminal gangs bent on
destabilizing the country and living off the spoils of
lawlessness. On the other hand, according to one organization
leader, community groups that were passed over by Aristide's
focus on loyalty rather than ideas, were liberated by the
dissolution of the patronage system to pursue more
socio-economic -- rather than political -- goals. Desperate
to play a role in the transition process, these groups claim
an existent network on the ground they say is perfectly
placed to assist the IGOH and the international community
with anything from disarmament talks to elections
registration to trash cleanup. 

7. (SBU) As with students, however, many of these
organizations complain the IGOH and international donors have
ignored their offers, and assert persuasively that
initiatives from dialogue to disarmament have failed because
the government and the UN have attempted to impose solutions
from above without engaging the population to help solve
Haiti's problems themselves. They also bemoan Haiti's
"antiquated" political class and argue that elections would
be meaningless without a new cadre of modern politicians.
Although almost unanimous in their reproach of the IGOH (and
often MINUSTAH) and skepticism of political parties, they
retain a sense of hope and interest in elections. 

8. (SBU) During a roundtable with the Ambassador on June 7,
group leaders from the poorer neighborhoods appealed to the
international community (and the United States in particular)
to intervene in the neighborhoods and "provide youth with
alternatives to joining gangs." Jean Enock Joseph from
Collectif des Notables de Cite Soleil (CONOCS) called for an
aggressive, organized social policy to fight against misery
and lawlessness, saying residents were "desperate, but not
hopeless." Belgarde Berton, who represents over 300 popular
organizations in the Group of 184, called for the
international community to work together with local
organizations to ensure investment goes to the people who
need it, rather than to a clique of local interests. Carlot
Paulemon, leader of Rassemblement Nationale des Citoyens
Organises pour le Development d'Haiti (RANCODHA), an umbrella
organization of neighborhood organizations, pointed to the
recent success of a June 4th Community Forum in Cite Soleil
as a model of "bottom-up" reconciliation unmatched by IGOH
promises of a grand National Dialogue. (Note: the Community
Forum was funded in part by USAID via a grant from NDI. End
note). The groups sent a clear demand for more micro-oriented
projects and social reintegration on a local scale. 


9. (SBU) Divided and simply scared off the streets by the
threat of chimere revenge, student groups are unlikely to
mobilize in a mass, public display of anger against the IGOH.
Most have by now accepted the inevitability of elections and
are juggling bids from political parties for support. Without
a new political personality to motivate them, the diverse
groups are likely to remain as splintered politically as the
numerous political parties themselves. It is unfortunate,
however, that student energy could not be harnessed for good,
as their support for elections and eagerness to play a role
have the potential to stimulate greater public enthusiasm. A
unified and public youth movement for elections and against
violence would help grant the transition process the public
relations momentum it needs to overcome the public's
obsession with security concerns. 

10. (SBU) We have already pointed to the need to introduce
flexible, quick-start development projects in Bel Air and
Cite Soleil if and when the security environment permits it.
Post is making a considerable effort to engage and support
student and other peaceful, non-political "base movements" in
these areas to provide a hopeful alternative to the gangs
that dominate their neighborhoods. But much more could, and
should, be done. We stand ready to work both independently
and in cooperation with others to fulfill our pledge if
MINUSTAH fulfills theirs to pacify the slums. 




E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015

REF: A. PAP 2412
     B. 04 PAP 1874 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Erna Kerst for Reasons: 1.4 (b
and d) 

1.  (SBU)  Introduction: The Provisional Electoral Council
(CEP) officially sanctioned 45 parties to participate in
upcoming elections.  Traditionally, most, if not all, of the
political parties have been vehicles to catapult an
individual into the office of the presidency.  Larger, more
established, parties such as OPL and Fusion of Social
Democrats (Fusion) are running candidates at all levels.
However, TetAnsanm, MOCHRENHA, UNION Pour Haiti
(MIDH/Lavalas), RDNP, Alyans (KID/PPRH), and relative
newcomers FRN, JPDN, MPH, MODEREH, KOMBA, and L'Espwa are
also running several candidates in a majority of the races.
The remainder of the 45 CEP-approved parties are
concentrating on certain seats where they have regional
presence.  This message provides capsule summaries of the
most important political parties, updating ref B.  End

On the Left

3.  (U)  Struggling People's Organization (OPL):  OPL was
originally Lavalas Political Organization, but changed its
name when Aristide broke from the party in 1994 and created
Fanmi Lavalas.  The party has a strong national structure
throughout Haiti.  Its doctrinaire socialist orientation is a
legacy of the late Gerard-Pierre Charles, the party's
founder, who became a committed communist while exiled in
Mexico during the Duvalier era. 

Key Leaders:
    Paul Denis (presidential candidate)
    Edgar LeBlanc, Jr. (Secretary General, senatorial
    Rosny Smarth (National Executive, former PM)
    Suzy Castor (National Executive) 

4.  (SBU)  Fusion Party of Social Democrats (FUSION): Fusion
formed following a successful merger of smaller parties
PANPRA, KONAKOM and Ayiti Kapab in April 2005.  OPL and
TetAnsanm, both included in the original talks regarding the
merger, opted out due to differences in the proposed
power-sharing structure (OPL, the largest of the parties
involved wanted more influence) and over presidential
aspirations of the leadership.  According to the party's
president, FUSION is represented in 24 of the 30 senatorial
races and 84 of the 99 deputy races.  The party's president
told the Charge November 22 that Fusion is looking to control
both houses.  He said that if the party could not win a
majority, it would work to create a bloc within parliament to
work with the president (regardless of the president's
party).  Benoit had earlier told Poloff November 4 that if
the Fusion presidential candidate wins and Fusion has a
majority, the party would still have a representative
cabinet, offering "5 ministers out of 15" to other parties. 

Key Leaders:
     Serge Gilles (presidential candidate)
     Victor Benoit (President of party)
     Robert Auguste (Secretary General)
     Micha Gaillard (spokesperson) 

5.  (U)  Union Pour Haiti (UNION): A formal alliance between
center-right party MIDH (Movement to Introduce Democracy in
Haiti) and the Fanmi Lavalas leadership.  Standard bearer
Marc Bazin has worked hard to cultivate the Lavalas masses
who supported former president Aristide.  Bazin is the
ultimate survivor of Haitian politics; he served in each
successive government beginning with Jean-Claude Duvalier. 

Key Leaders:
      Marc Bazin (presidential candidate)
      Leslie Voltaire (campaign manager)
      Ivon Feuille (senatorial candidate-South) 

6.  (SBU)  Democratic Alliance (Alyans):  A formal alliance
between populist party Democratic Unity Committee (KID) and
the Popular Party for the Renewal of Haiti (PPRH).  The party
is centered around well-known politician Evans Paul (aka
K-Plim, his pseudonym from a radio program in which he told
children's stories).  Paul, a former mayor of Port-au-Prince,
is extremely popular in the capital, but less so in the
provinces.  Alyans continues to pursue strategic alliances
and has been in contact with OPL, Fusion and to a lesser
extent PNDPH.
Key Leaders:
     Evans Paul (presidential candidate)
     Claude Roumain (PPRH national coordinator) 

On the Right

7.  (SBU)  National Assembly of Progressive Democrats (RDNP):
This is perhaps founder and former president Leslie Manigat's
last run for the presidency.  RDNP has a strong party
infrastructure, however, Manigat's unrelenting hold on the
reins of leadership has limited the party's growth. 

Key Leaders:
     Leslie Manigat (presidential candidate, former President)
     Myrlande Manigat (Leslie's spouse and campaign manager;
senatorial candidate-West) 

8.  (U)  Christian Movement for a New Haiti (MOCHRENHA):
Protestant party with regional strength in Gonaives (hometown
of the party's founder) and throughout the Artibonite and
Central Plateau.  Over one thousand supporters crowded a
downtown Port-au-Prince basketball gymnasium for MOCHRENHA's
October 8 campaign launch.  Presidential candidate Luc
Mesadieu promised a university in each of the Haiti's ten
Departments, increasing the Haitian National Police to 20,000
and bringing back the armed forces of Haiti.  This last
promise drew the loudest applause.  Axan Abellard, of
REPONSE, and rejected presidential candidate Osner Fevry
(PDCH-II) each spoke in support of Mesadieu's candidacy. 

Key Leaders:
     Luc Mesadieu (presidential candidate)
     Sylvio Dieudonne (senatorial candidate-West) 

9.  (C)  Heads Together (Tet Ansanm  Originally a regional
party with strength in the South, Tet Ansanm gained national
notoriety after choosing Haitian-American businessman Dumas
Simeus as its presidential candidate.  The CEP opted to leave
his name off the list of final presidential candidates due to
the Nationalities Commission's findings (and ignoring an
earlier Haitian supreme court ruling in Simeus' favor) that
he holds an American passport.  The party is fielding
candidates across the board nationally and may form a
significant bloc within parliament.  The secretary general, a
doctor by training and former Aristide Health Minister,
likely stifled his own presidential ambitions for a chance at
becoming prime minister. 

Key Leaders:
     Dumarsais Simeus (disputed presidential candidate)
     Gerard Blot (Secretary General) 

New Comers

10.  (SBU) Platform for Hope (L'Espwa/L'Espoir):
Left-leaning political alliance between ESKAMP (Solidarity to
Construct a Popular Alternative), PLB (Open the Gate Party)
and KOREGA, a peasants civic organization.  The party appears
to be strong in the South, Southeast and Grand Anse
departments and some cities in the north (ref A).  Despite
being new on the scene, the party's presidential candidate,
former president Rene Preval, appears to be the favorite in
the presidential race.  Other parties fear that Preval is
strong enough to avoid a second round and some have called
for parties to consider coalescing around a consensus
candidate to challenge the former president (septel).  A
November 3 march of 3000 Preval supporters was tarnished by
some who engaged in minor violence, robbery and vandalism
along the route. 

Key Leaders:
     Rene Preval (presidential candidate; former President)
     Bob Manuel (campaign manager, former State Secretary for
Public Security)
     Joseph Jasme (ESKAMP) 

11.  (SBU)  Committee to Build Haiti KOMBA:  The left-leaning
Kombit Pour Bati Ayiti ("Combat") was co-founded in February
2005 by Aristide's Minister of Youth and Sports and a leader
of the large rural organization, Mouvement des Paysans de
Papaye (MPP, Papaya Peasants Movement).  Its strong rural
backing makes KOMBA a force to contend with in this year's
elections.  When the party was founded, many believed it
would be the vehicle for former president Rene Preval to
launch a bid to reclaim the presidency.  To the contrary,
however, KOMBA's leadership launched tirades against Preval.
Media reported September 30 that KOMBA will back the
candidacy of independent Charlito Baker.  Baker introduced
MPP founder and KOMBA co-founder Jean-Baptiste to the Charge
November 22 as Charlito's campaign manager. 

Key Leaders:
     Evans Lescouflair
     Chavannes Jean-Baptiste (MPP) 

12.  (C)  Mobilization for Haiti's Progress (MPH):  Centrist
party founded in November 2004 by Haitian-American and
presidential candidate Samir Mourra.  Mourra failed to make
it onto the final presidential ballot due to his U.S.
citizenship.  Mourra has pursued the same legal strategy as
Dumas Simeus and challenged the ruling before the Supreme
Court.  The case, pending before the court for over two
weeks, is now in perpetual limbo due to the natural death of
a supreme court justice November 27 (preventing the court
from reaching a quorum and the ability to render a decision
on the case).   Mourra considers the CEP "corrupt" and
alleged interim Prime Minister Latortue played a personal
role in the decision to remove Dumas Simeus from the ballot
(thereby affecting his own candidacy).  Mourra said he would
fully support the international community running the
elections on behalf of the CEP.  MPH is fielding 16
senatorial candidates and 77 deputy candidates.  Mourra
claims to be self-financing his campaign and the "4000"
(including municipal) candidacies of his party. He told
PolOff that he has spent more than $500,000 USD (Note: Mourra
runs a mortgage company in Miami Lakes where his family still
resides. End Note).  MPH's philosophy is economics-based and
looks to create jobs by concentrating national production on
agriculture and attracting foreign direct investment. 

Key Leaders:
     Samir Mourra (presidential candidate)
     Chrisler Elmira (campaign manager)
     Herve Leveille (party vice president) 

13.  (U)  Justice for Peace and National Development (JPDN):
Right of center party founded earlier this year by a former
Finance Minister who was previously head of the
Port-au-Prince bar association.  The party was a merger of
three smaller defunct parties and 23 civic organizations.
The party is actively pro-FADH (former Haitian military). 

Key Leader:
     Rigaud Duplan (presidential candidate) 

14.  (SBU)  The Front for National Reconstruction (FRN):  A
FRN publication states the party's main objective is to
"contribute to the creation of a modern, developed state,
respectful of a democratic order..."  FRN is likely to win
some seats in local and parliamentary elections, particularly
in Gonaives.  Guy Phillipe, in the news repeatedly since
early last year for his involvement in the events leading up
to Aristide's downfall, announced his presidential candidacy
on July 4, 2005.  For most of the past year, Phillipe has
been sounding more moderate in an attempt to erase the image
of him as a rebel leader. He applauded the stepped-up
vigilance of MINUSTAH and was included amongst political
party leaders that met with the UN Security Council here in
April.  A FRN senatorial candidate once told PolOffs "our
economics is on the right; our social policy is on the left." 

Key Leaders:
     Guy Phillipe (presidential candidate)
     Winter Etienne (spokesperson; senatorial
     Goodwork Noel (National Executive, member of Preliminary
National Dialogue Committee) 

15.  (C)  Artibonite in Action (LAAA):  This party was
founded earlier this year and is based in Gonaives.  It is
only running candidates in the Artibonite region, the most
notable being the interim prime minister's nephew who is
running for senate.  This party may have nefarious sources of
income and has already been implicated in gang-related
violence in the poorer neighborhoods of Raboteau and Jubilee
in Gonaives. 

Key Leader:
      Youri Latortue (senatorial candidate) 

16.  (U)  For Us All (PONT):  An off-shoot of Fanmi Lavalas.
The party was founded in Jacmel and has limited reach beyond
the South. 

Key Leader:
     Jean-Marie Cherestal (presidential candidate, former PM)
DE RUEHPU #1073 1671912
O 161912Z JUN 06 ZDK




E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2011

Classified By: Ambassador Janet Sanderson for reason 1.4(b). 

1.  (C) President Preval on June 15 announced the nomination
of current Haitian National Police (HNP) Director General
Mario Andresol to continue in his position for three more
years.  The Senate must now approve the nomination by
majority vote.  The justice and security committee will begin
examination of his nomination in the coming week.  Andresol
may face some scrutiny from senate President Joseph Lambert
and justice and security committee President Youri Latortue,
both of whom are widely believed to be involved in illegal
activities.  Bolstered by Preval's direct support, however,
we expect Andresol to gain Senate approval. 

2. (C) Since replacing Leon Charles as DG in summer, Andresol
has gained the respect of rich and poor alike, as he has
attempted to root out corruption within the force, improve
performance, and combat a wave of kidnapping that peaked at
the end of 2005, but shows signs of resurging.     Andresol
enjoys the confidence of Robert Manuel, Preval's closest
advisor on police and security matters, and Rene Momplaisir,
Preval's liaison to the poor masses -- and almost certainly
at least some gang leaders -- in Cite Soleil.   In
cooperation with MINUSTAH political and disarmament
officials, Andresol has also quietly entertained feelers from
several gang leaders in Cite Soleil and other poor
neighborhoods, notably Amaral Duclonat, who have expressed
interest in some kind of truce with the HNP.  Andresol also
collaborated closely with UNPol commissioner Graham Muir in
repairing the damage over MINUSTAH's release of an HNP reform
plan Haitians regarded as infringement on their sovereignty,
and redrafting a reform program that will lead to productive
cooperation with UNPol and far-reaching HNP reform. 

3. (C) Comment.  Preval's nomination of Andresol is a
significant step forward.  Andresol has not only promoted
honesty and integrity within the HNP, but has undertaken
significant iniiatives, such as the draft HNP rform plan
with MINUSTAH, that would have almost ertainly come grinding
to a halt without his contnued leadership.  We look forward
to maintainingour own close bi-lateral cooperation through
himand expanding overall multi-lateral coordination as we
intensify our efforts to rebuild the HNP.
DE RUEHPU #1407/01 2141901
O 021901Z AUG 06




E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016

REF: A. PAP 1393
     B. PAP 1386 

PORT AU PR 00001407  001.2 OF 003 

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d

1. (C) Summary: UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) Edmond Mulet warned A/S Shannon on July 25
that provocations by former president Aristide and his
supporters could erode Haiti's post-electoral stability.
Mulet said that President Preval's public silence about
security problems and inability to decide on a strategy have
made it difficult for MINUSTAH to take concrete measures to
improve security.  Over the long term, Mulet feared Latin
troop-contributors' military commitment to Haiti could wane,
and he encouraged the U.S. to weigh-in with them in favor of
a continued presence.  Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on
Haiti, saying it would call for a one-year extension of the
mandate and a more active MINUSTAH role on justice and
security issues.  To improve the security situation, Mulet
asked the U.S. to expand its drug interdiction efforts in
Haiti and ease the U.S. embargo on weapons and ammunition for
the Haitian National Police and UN forces.  A/S Shannon
assured Mulet of strong USG  support for MINUSTAH and our
eagerness to see its stabilization mission succeed.  End

2.  (U) Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon and Ambassador
Sanderson, along with A/DCM and WHA/CAR Director Brian
Nichols, met for an hour-long conversation with MINUSTAH SRSG
Edmond Mulet, on the margins of the July 25 Haiti Donors'

GOH does not Control Provinces
- - - - - - - - - - 

3. (C) Mulet described the difficulties facing MINUSTAH and
the Haitian government.  He rued the "complete lack of the
state" in Haiti, especially outside the capital, where the
GOH has been unable to enforce the rule of law.  For example,
he explained that leaders in the northern town of Ouanaminthe
have created their own criminal fiefdom.  As a result, drug
trafficking has become an increasingly alarming problem,
which is difficult to combat, in part because of the drug
ties within the Haitian Government.  In this connection, he
mentioned Senate leader Joseph Lambert and Security
Commission Chair Youri Latortue -- describing the latter as a
"drug dealer."  Mulet continued that the judicial system
could not impose the rule of law, because the Haitian
National Police (HNP) lacked investigation skills and the few
judges who have not been corrupted feared ruling against
drug-related criminals.  Without the basic rule of law,
MINUSTAH's progress and development work in Haiti have been
severely limited. 

Aristide Movement Must be Stopped
- - - - - - - - - - 

4. (C) Mulet also worried that former president Jean Bertrand
Aristide's influence could continue to disrupt government and
UN progress in Haiti.  Mulet claimed Aristide has sent agents
to Haiti to rally support for his return.  These instigators
have stoked public fear and warned of a new round of violence
in Port-au-Prince.  Mulet said that at his request, on the
margins of last month's African Union summit, UNSYG Annan had
urged South African President Mbeki to ensure that Aristide
remained in South Africa.  Mbeki reportedly replied that
Aristide's presence cost the Mbeki government financially
through security and housing expenses and prompted
significant political criticism from the opposition.  Judging
Aristide's continued tenure in South Africa uncertain, Mulet
urged U.S. legal action against Aristide to prevent the
former president from gaining more traction with the Haitian
population and returning to Haiti. 

GOH Unsure on Security
- - - - - - - - - - 

5. (C) Mulet said he meets nearly daily with Preval and Prime
Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis on the situation in Haiti.
Preval frequently has a clear plan of action that he wants
MINUSTAH to pursue.  However, when MINUSTAH develops
operational plans based on Preval's wishes, the President
then changes his mind and proposes an entirely different
approach.  Preval's indecision has left MINUSTAH planners and
troops unable to develop a coordinated strategy with the GOH
in response to the security situation.  Publicly, Preval has
accompanied his indecision by complete silence, which is
working to erode his government's credibility.  Mulet said
that when he encouraged Preval to speak out, the President
replied that "silence is my best ally." 

Renewed Mandate to Focus on Rule of Law
- - - - - - - - - - 

6. (C) Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on Haiti, stating
that the report would recommend that the
Security Council extend MINUSTAH's mandate for one-year and
focus its efforts towards security and the rule of law.  He
continued that he had initially sought an "executive
mandate," with greater powers under Chapter VII, the UNSYG
had encouraged him to seek a more focused force configuration
within the current mandate.  To achieve that, Mulet said
MINUSTAH planned to add anti-kidnapping experts, Honduran
SWAT units, and Peruvian special forces that will allow it to
take on gangs and crime directly.  Mulet said increased
MINUSTAH effectiveness in support of democratic institutions
and economic development will hinge on the ability of the
donor countries to coordinate their assistance programs.  He
cited the HNP as an example of the international community's
failure to work in concert.  Each donor country has pushed
its own policing model and donor efforts contradicted one
another.  Mulet suggested that police donors offer a seminar
for the GOH that explains the various policing models and
lets the GOH choose. He regretted that the HNP reform plan
has been "sitting on the Prime Minister's desk" for about one
month, awaiting final signature. 

Elections Pose Challenge
- - - - - - - - - - 

7.  (C) In response to A/S Shannon's query, Mulet said that
he opposed holding municipal and legislative elections later
this fall.  Under the constitution, Haiti must hold up to 11
elections during Preval's term, including runoffs.  For
example, next year, one-third of the Senate will face
election.  This will entail a nation-wide vote that will cost
an estimated USD 30 million.  Mulet added that election of
municipal and local governments will lead to a major
financial burden on the government, which lacks the
resources to sustain such a heavy administrative structure.
Mulet has raised these concerns with Preval and suggested
that the government amend the constitution to streamline
these processes.  But, Preval rejected delaying local
elections, stressing the importance of municipal and local
government to development of the judiciary and electoral
council under Haitian law.  Preval reportedly did not want to
fast track changes in the constitution.  Due to a complicated
amendment formula, it would take some nine years to effect
constitutional change, under the existing rules. 

MINUSTAH Could Lose Steam Over Long Run
- - - - - - - - - - 

8. (C) Over the long-term, Mulet worried that fatigue from
MINUSTAH's military and police contributors as well as
Venezuela's possible election to the Security Council could
jeopardize MINUSTAH's mandate.  Mulet explained that though
Argentina is committed through February of 2007, it has
considered lowering its troop commitment to Haiti.
Meanwhile, Chile has already recuperated three helicopters
from MINUSTAH, which has significantly limited MINUSTAH's
mobility.  Mulet reported that the seven South American troop
contributors are planning a meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and Defense in Buenos Aires on August 4 to discuss
troop levels and the MINUSTAH mandate.  In addition, he
worried that Venezuela's possible election to the Security
Council could jeopardize Haiti's Chapter VII status.  Mulet
said that the Venezuelan ambassador to Haiti had told him
that in Caracas' view Haiti does not require a Chapter VII

Possible U.S. Roles
- - - - - - - - - - 

9. (C) Mulet asked for U.S. assistance in a number of areas
to help bolster the UN's effort in Haiti.  He said that
increased U.S. anti-drug efforts south of Hispaniola could
disrupt the drug trade and help Haitian authorities regain
control in the provinces.  He also asked that the USG carve
out exceptions for the UN and HNP in its arms embargo against
Haiti.  While he said that some of the UN military contingents
brought their own ammunition with them, many of them need to
re-supply from the U.S.  Finally, he applauded U.S. efforts
to train South American peacekeepers, which he said directly
contributed to continued interest by countries such as
Bolivia to contribute military contingents to Haiti.  A/S
Shannon assured Mulet of strong USG support for MINUSTAH and
its stabilization role.  Shannon offered -- and subsequently
followed through (reftels A and B) -- to press Preval and
Prime Minister Alexis to
take more forceful action on security issues, in close
coordination with MINUSTAH.  Shannon and Mulet agreed that,
if MINUSTAH fails to stabilize Haiti during this period of
opportunity, then it is likely the international community
will have to return to Haiti with a larger and more costly
operation in the future. 

- - - - 

10. (C) Mulet is an articulate and focused SRSG who has a
good grasp of the challenges facing his mission despite being
in his job only seven weeks.  His frustration with Preval's
inaction and indecision is evident.  Mulet clearly wants
MINUSTAH to take a more assertive approach to security than
his predecessor and should enjoy greater political leeway in
Latin capitals to do so in support of a democratically
elected government.
“La vraie reconstruction d’Haïti passe par des réformes en profondeur des structures de l’État pour restaurer la confiance, encourager les investisseurs et mettre le peuple au travail. Il faut finir avec cette approche d’un État paternaliste qui tout en refusant de créer le cadre approprié pour le développement des entreprises mendie des millions sur la scène internationale en exhibant la misère du peuple.” Cyrus Sibert


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