WIKELEAKS CABLE # 1C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001487 SIPDIS WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA DS/DSS/ITA DSERCC E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC ECON EWWT SUBJECT: HAITIAN PRIVATE SECTOR PANICKED BY INCREASING VIOLENCE REF: A. PAP 1373 ¶B. PAP 1027 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Fritz Mevs, a member of one of Haiti's richest families and a well-connected member of the private sector elite, told Poloff on May 13 that business leaders are exasperated by the lack of security in the vital port and industrial zone areas of Port-au-Prince and are allegedly arming local police with long-guns and ammunition in an effort to ensure security for their businesses and employees. Kidnappings and carjackings are frightening Haiti's small but critical cadre of mid-level employees who work in the industrial park and port, and workers have threatened to strike unless the security situation improves, Mevs said. (Note: This area is either off-limits or LAV-travel only for the embassy. End Note.) Mevs said that the recent killing of gang leader Labaniere is part of the problem, as he used to keep rival gangs out of the area. Mevs also said private sector protests against the IGOH for the lack of security were misguided and called for a media campaign to mobilize opposition against what he described as the true scourge of Haiti: a cabal of drug-traffickers, Haitian elite and IGOH insiders conspiring with gangs and corrupt cops to undermine peace and democracy in the country. In response to embassy and private sector prodding, MINUSTAH is now formulating a plan to protect the area. End summary. Background ---------- ¶2. (C) Fritz Mevs is a prominent member of one of Haiti's richest families. He leads a group of local investors who own and operate in Port-au-Prince the Terminal of Varreux (the private terminal that handles 30% of Haiti's imports), the petroleum storage of WINECO (which encompasses Haiti's largest propane gas storage center) and the SHODECOSA Warehouse Complex (where, among other things, 90% of the humanitarian cargo donated to Haiti is stored). The Mevs family has always enjoyed financial control of important Haitian economic assets and has shown an ability to roll with (and have influence upon) any government that allows them to exploit those assets. Port Area Suffering from Insecurity ----------------------------------- ¶3. (C) Mevs told Poloff on May 13 that the security situation in and around the port and industrial zone area was untenable. The district is surrounded by the gang havens of Bel Air, La Saline and Cite Soleil, and kidnappers and carjackers target traffic along the vital transport link (Route Nationale #1) between the port and the Industrial Park. Mevs said the crime threat has already forced several businesses to close (including the Embassy's GSO operations), while employees of others are threatening to strike unless the security situation improves. Among those Mevs cited as caught in the midst of the "urban warfare" are: CEMEX, TOTAL, DINHASA, TEXACO, MADSEN Import-Export, SOGENER, and others. Mevs said absenteeism among employees is at an all-time high and the flow of essential commodities (oil, gasoline, cement, rice, steel, etc.) transiting through the facility is adversely affected. Continued disruption, he said, will soon result in shortages, inflation, and potentially a collapse in support for the transition government. (Note: The Director General of the National Port Authority has separately confirmed Mevs account of the situation outside of the port. While security inside the port is acceptable, just outside of the gates criminals operate freely. Gunfire is common and workers fear for their lives going to and from work every day. He said MINUSTAH, while present, does not provide any real security for employees going into or out of the port. End Note.) ¶4. (C) Mevs showed Poloff a pile of letters sent from the Terminal authority and several of its members to MINUSTAH SRSG Valdes, Prime Minister Latortue, HNP Director General Leon Charles, and Minister of Justice Gousse over the last two months. The letters describe a lengthy list of incidents and vulnerabilities - including pipeline sabotage, criminal fires, shots fired at offloading vessels, kidnappings and murders - and solicit additional, permanent security, often in quite desperate language ("we may not hold on for long"). The Terminal's large army of security staff are outgunned by the heavy weapons fired by the bandits, the letters say, and must stand helplessly at the gate, unable to intervene when those entering or exiting are hijacked, robbed, shot and at times, killed, outside the jurisdiction of the Terminal fences. According to Mevs, although MINUSTAH has on occasion parked armored vehicles near the Terminal with some success, he said criminals regularly force the tanks to move (by burning tires or fecal matter nearby), and as soon as the vehicles depart, the rampage continues. ¶5. (C) Other embassy contacts confirm Mevs' description of the deteriorated security situation in the port area. A political advisor to the Mayor of Cite Soleil told PolOff on May 17 that MINUSTAH was proving to be a poor substitute for Labaniere, the gang leader from the Boston neighborhood of Cite Soleil closest to the industrial zone who was killed on March 30, allegedly in a plot directed by rival pro-Lavalas gang leader Dread Wilme. The advisor said that Labaniere (who reportedly received money from businesses in the district for protection) managed to defend the commercial zone in a way that periodic MINUSTAH checkpoints have not. He said bandits were undaunted by UN vehicles sometimes parked along Route Nationale #1 and that MINUSTAH troops (who, he said, rarely set foot outside of their vehicles) were unable to identify the bandits from amongst the general populace as Labaniere had done. ¶6. (C) Meanwhile, a MINUSTAH official told PolOff on May 18 that the Cite Soleil operation begun on March 31 was indeed weakening due to Brazilian and Jordanian troop rotations that could last 4-8 weeks. Permanent checkpoints along Route Nationale and other areas surrounding Cite Soleil have been replaced by rotating outposts concentrated primarily north of the commercial district, leaving much of the area described by Mevs unprotected. Another MINUSTAH commander confirmed on May 20 that UN troops were drawing down, to be replaced by a joint HNP-CIVPOL strategy that would effectively block a critical section of the highway to all vehicular traffic (septel). Embassy Port-au-Prince's Response --------------------------------- ¶7. (C) Charge met with UNSRSG Valdes on May 14 to encourage him to dramatically increase MINUSTAH's security presence in the area. Valdes seemed genuinely surprised that the situation was so acute. Following the meeting Charge encouraged the French ambassador to reiterate our message with Valdes. In response Valdes instructed MINUSTAH military and CIVPOL leaders to develop a plan in coordination with the private sector, who rejected an initial proposal as unworkable. On May 19 Ambassador Foley wrote to Ambassador Valdes to protest three examples of MINUSTAH passivity in response to violence against American citizens. Ambassador Foley again underscored the need for a swift, aggressive response to criminal elements in a conversation with Valdes on May 20. Valdes thanked the Ambassador for the concrete examples described in the Ambassador's letter. He said that he had often heard reports but never had details with which he could confront MINUSTAH military and police leaders. Valdes promised a more robust response from MINUSTAH. Separately, a MINUSTAH military officer reported to the Core Group on May 20 that they were preparing to present another strategy to business representatives on May 21. Ambassador Foley warned the Core Group that MINUSTAH's stand-down in Cite Soleil put the elections at risk, and that the insecurity around the industrial zone risked undermining what is left of the Haitian economy. Private Sector Arming the Police -------------------------------- ¶8. (C) In response to MINUSTAH's unresponsiveness, Mevs said, a group of merchants from the Terminal conducted an unofficial survey of the HNP's weapons inventory and requirements. The report (on official HNP letterhead indicating some form of HNP cooperation in the effort) suggests, for example, that the Port-au-Prince station has (2) M-14s, (2) T-65s, and (2) M-1s, and needed (6) M-14s, (8) T-65s, and (4) Galils. (Note: Embassy has not independently confirmed any of the numbers from the report. End note). The undated report shows the HNP has the following country-wide inventory: -- (65) 12-guage rifles -- (11) M-14 -- (15) T-65 -- (15) M-1 -- 82 functioning vehicles -- 179 radios and the following needs: -- (200) T-65 -- (127) galils -- (120) M-14 -- (43) M-1 -- (73) 12-guage rifles -- 160 vehicles -- 249 radios ¶9. (C) Mevs said some business owners have already begun to purchase weapons and ammunition from the street and distribute them to local police officials in exchange for regular patrols. Mevs claimed, for example, that Reginald Boulos, President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, had already distributed arms to the police and had called on others to do so in order to provide cover to his own actions. Mevs says that of the roughly 150 business owners in the area, probably 30 have already provided some kind of direct assistance (including arms, ammunition, or other materiel) to the police, and the rest are looking to do so soon. Contacts of the Econ Counselor report from time to time of discussions among private sector leaders to fund and arm their own private sector armies. The AmCham Board of Directors at one point discussed informally giving non-lethal assistance to police stations, such as furniture and microwave ovens for police stations, but decided against doing so for fear that anything given to the police would quickly be stolen. ¶10. (C) Mevs defended the idea of the private sector arming the police in general, but he lamented the haphazard manner in which many of his colleagues seemed to be handing out weapons with little control. He said they were "wasting their money" by giving arms to police without knowing if they were "dirty or clean" and with no measures in place to make sure the arms were not simply re-sold. He also complained that funneling the arms secretly would only serve to reinforce rumors that the elite were creating private armies. Mevs said he was approaching the Embassy in order to find a way for these private sector initiatives to be incorporated into established inventory and control systems within the HNP. He described his conception of a program in which the private sector could purchase guns and ammunition on the open market and turn the equipment over to the HNP in exchange for a receipt and a guarantee that a certain number of appropriately-armed HNP would be assigned to a requested area. He said, however, that he did not trust either MINUSTAH or the HNP to properly control the issuance of weapons and hoped that the U.S. would oversee the program. Haiti's "new enemy" ------------------- ¶11. (C) In response to the May 11 protest (supported by some private sector leaders such as Charles Baker) to demand that the IGOH address the security situation, Mevs said their target was wrong. He said protesters should mobilize against Haiti's real enemy and the true source of insecurity: a small nexus of drug-dealers and political insiders that control a network of dirty cops and gangs that not only were responsible for committing the kidnappings and murders, but were also frustrating the efforts of well-meaning government officials and the international community to confront them. He asserted, for example, that some incidents were engineered specifically to frustrate efforts by the IGOH to secure a weapons export license waiver from the Department of State. Mevs claimed that Colombian drug-traffickers (and allegedly the brother of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez) had allied with a small cabal of powerful and connected individuals, including Youri Latortue, Gary Lissade, lawyer Andre Pasquet, Michel Brunache (Chief of Staff to President Alexandre), Jean Mosanto Petit (aka Toto Borlette, owner of the unofficial Haitian lottery and large swaths of Port-au-Prince property), and Dany Toussaint, to create a criminal enterprise that thrives on - and generates - instability. (Note: We have no corroborating information linking Brunache to drug-trafficking. He, along with Latortue, Pasquet, and Justice Minister Gousse. all worked in Gary Lissade's law firm.) ¶12. (C) Mevs suggested that some recent kidnappings (including that of Dr. Michel Theard - ref B) were actually targeted crimes meant to send a message to the people within the IGOH that the network was calling the shots. (Comment: This obviously contradicts his claim that IGOH insiders are involved. End Comment.) Mevs claimed that Dr. Theard had been passed between several supposedly independent gangs, thereby illustrating how the gangs were actually joined together by a "central node." It was against this network, Mevs argued, that well-meaning Haitians should direct their ire, and he called for a mass popular mobilization against this unnamed (but apparently obvious) cabal: the "new common enemy following the departure of President Aristide." Comment ------- ¶13. (C) Fritz Mevs undoubtedly has a strong personal interest in convincing us that the port district is in danger and he is no doubt biased against those individuals he names who work against his interests. Mevs himself is a core member of what might easily be described as a rival network of influence competing for control of Haiti against the cast of characters he has described. Furthermore, it is impossible to imagine that Mevs has managed to protect his interests over the years without making some accommodation with potentially hostile government principals and the associated gang leaders at his doorstep (indeed his silence on Aristide's continuing role in the violence is curious). While we cannot confirm whether the alleged cabal of political insiders allied with South American narco-traffickers is controlling the gangs, we have seen indications of alliances between drug dealers, criminal gangs and political forces that could threaten to make just such a scenario possible via the election of narco-funded politicians, unless we are able to severely disrupt the flow of drugs into and out of Haiti. One thing is clear: it is vital that our plan to equip the HNP through strict controls go forward immediately. In the meantime, we will deliver strong messages to Charles and the IGOH (and our private sector contacts) against private delivery of arms to the HNP. End Comment. FOLEY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001793 SIPDIS WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA DS/DSS/ITA DSERCC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL HA SUBJECT: HAITIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT DIVIDED BUT YOUTH GENERALLY SUPPORT TRANSITION REF: 04 PAP 244 ¶1. (U) Summary: In the year since Aristide's departure, university student groups and other youth-oriented organizations have shifted their focus from grassroots political activism (the "shock-troops" of the anti-Aristide movement - reftel) and returned for the most part to their founding principles -- academic reforms, employment, and socio-economic development. The transition/election process has also afforded an opportunity for student and youth organizations to broaden their portfolio to include civic education, national dialogue and support for the political process. Student groups, once courageous and united in their opposition to Aristide, are now divided -- and fearful -- and represent little threat to the IGOH, despite their dissatisfaction with it (see septel summary of the divided student movement). Youth groups in general are bitter that their efforts to rid Haiti of Aristide have gone unrewarded, and they bristle at being marginalized from the transition process. Post is seeking to engage and support those groups that seek to play a peaceful role in political and social development. End summary. Student support strong for elections; weak for the IGOH --------------------------------------------- ---------- ¶2. (SBU) Students at first praised the transparency of the IGOH but soon began to criticize the lack of tangible results and the absence of any engagement with the youth movement. Students believe that they were responsible for bringing down Aristide and installing the IGOH and begrudge the IGOH for ignoring them over the course of the last year. They long for a consultative role on issues and are frustrated that they have not received any benefits from the IGOH that they believe they brought to power. They often say, though with little conviction, that they could "rise again" at any moment if the IGOH does not respond to their requests for inclusion. ¶3. (SBU) The IGOH's loss of credibility among the students has damaged student faith in elections as well. One ex-leader of the CdC told Poloff that the IGOH had proven itself incapable of organizing anything, and it was only the international community that gave Haiti an "appearance of a State" and kept the bandits from taking power. Others claim the lack of any "new blood" among the politicians has dampened student enthusiasm. Above all, students are resentful that they have not been included in elections preparations efforts, and say they are uniquely qualified, uncommonly energetic, and ideally placed to help the CEP and the international community to implement the registration, civic education and voting process, if only the IGOH and the UN would let them play a role. Students divided, less mobilized -------------------------------- ¶4. (SBU) There were few instances in the past year where students have taken to the streets in a show of force. For the most part, students have the same complaints regarding the IGOH as the population at large (all talk and no action, lack of transparency and inclusion, inept and ineffective) but they are more emotional in their hostility. But students are more divided -- by ideology and interests -- than before and this discord has hindered action. Many students simply want to get a job or get out of the country, while their leaders seek to join Haiti's insular political class. Leaders often inflate scandals and spark crises in order to attract press and enter the political conscience. Many old student leaders try to prevent new leaders from emerging, and rumors are rife that the IGOH (and specifically Youri Latortue) is building an "intelligence cell" within the student movement for political ends. ¶5. (SBU) In this estranged environment, most student displays of force have been confused, small-scale rallies focused on narrow student interests and/or were staged to enhance the political image of student leaders: a sit-in at the Primature that mobilized no more than 50 backers of Saintilus; a hunger strike at the Faculty of Business that mixed its protest over the expulsion of a dozen students with a call for the overthrow of the IGOH; or a shouting match between private-sector backed GRAFNEH (see septel for group descriptions) and the more radical Faculty of Social Sciences on the security situation and role of MINUSTAH. To date, the primary student and youth groups have voiced their displeasure with the IGOH mostly in private, and at this stage are basically resigned to the idea of replacing the government via fall elections. Non-student youth organizations ------------------------------- ¶6. (SBU) The disruption of Aristide's patronage system that produced bands of "chimere" youth in targeted neighborhoods had two effects. Without viable alternatives, many of those who benefited from the handouts reconstituted themselves as the soldiers of the organized criminal gangs bent on destabilizing the country and living off the spoils of lawlessness. On the other hand, according to one organization leader, community groups that were passed over by Aristide's focus on loyalty rather than ideas, were liberated by the dissolution of the patronage system to pursue more socio-economic -- rather than political -- goals. Desperate to play a role in the transition process, these groups claim an existent network on the ground they say is perfectly placed to assist the IGOH and the international community with anything from disarmament talks to elections registration to trash cleanup. ¶7. (SBU) As with students, however, many of these organizations complain the IGOH and international donors have ignored their offers, and assert persuasively that initiatives from dialogue to disarmament have failed because the government and the UN have attempted to impose solutions from above without engaging the population to help solve Haiti's problems themselves. They also bemoan Haiti's "antiquated" political class and argue that elections would be meaningless without a new cadre of modern politicians. Although almost unanimous in their reproach of the IGOH (and often MINUSTAH) and skepticism of political parties, they retain a sense of hope and interest in elections. ¶8. (SBU) During a roundtable with the Ambassador on June 7, group leaders from the poorer neighborhoods appealed to the international community (and the United States in particular) to intervene in the neighborhoods and "provide youth with alternatives to joining gangs." Jean Enock Joseph from Collectif des Notables de Cite Soleil (CONOCS) called for an aggressive, organized social policy to fight against misery and lawlessness, saying residents were "desperate, but not hopeless." Belgarde Berton, who represents over 300 popular organizations in the Group of 184, called for the international community to work together with local organizations to ensure investment goes to the people who need it, rather than to a clique of local interests. Carlot Paulemon, leader of Rassemblement Nationale des Citoyens Organises pour le Development d'Haiti (RANCODHA), an umbrella organization of neighborhood organizations, pointed to the recent success of a June 4th Community Forum in Cite Soleil as a model of "bottom-up" reconciliation unmatched by IGOH promises of a grand National Dialogue. (Note: the Community Forum was funded in part by USAID via a grant from NDI. End note). The groups sent a clear demand for more micro-oriented projects and social reintegration on a local scale. Comment ------- ¶9. (SBU) Divided and simply scared off the streets by the threat of chimere revenge, student groups are unlikely to mobilize in a mass, public display of anger against the IGOH. Most have by now accepted the inevitability of elections and are juggling bids from political parties for support. Without a new political personality to motivate them, the diverse groups are likely to remain as splintered politically as the numerous political parties themselves. It is unfortunate, however, that student energy could not be harnessed for good, as their support for elections and eagerness to play a role have the potential to stimulate greater public enthusiasm. A unified and public youth movement for elections and against violence would help grant the transition process the public relations momentum it needs to overcome the public's obsession with security concerns. ¶10. (SBU) We have already pointed to the need to introduce flexible, quick-start development projects in Bel Air and Cite Soleil if and when the security environment permits it. Post is making a considerable effort to engage and support student and other peaceful, non-political "base movements" in these areas to provide a hopeful alternative to the gangs that dominate their neighborhoods. But much more could, and should, be done. We stand ready to work both independently and in cooperation with others to fulfill our pledge if MINUSTAH fulfills theirs to pacify the slums. GRIFFITHS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 002945 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA AND USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV HA SUBJECT: HAITI ELECTIONS: POLITICAL PARTY LANDSCAPE REF: A. PAP 2412 ¶B. 04 PAP 1874 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Erna Kerst for Reasons: 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (SBU) Introduction: The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) officially sanctioned 45 parties to participate in upcoming elections. Traditionally, most, if not all, of the political parties have been vehicles to catapult an individual into the office of the presidency. Larger, more established, parties such as OPL and Fusion of Social Democrats (Fusion) are running candidates at all levels. However, TetAnsanm, MOCHRENHA, UNION Pour Haiti (MIDH/Lavalas), RDNP, Alyans (KID/PPRH), and relative newcomers FRN, JPDN, MPH, MODEREH, KOMBA, and L'Espwa are also running several candidates in a majority of the races. The remainder of the 45 CEP-approved parties are concentrating on certain seats where they have regional presence. This message provides capsule summaries of the most important political parties, updating ref B. End Summary. On the Left ----------- ¶3. (U) Struggling People's Organization (OPL): OPL was originally Lavalas Political Organization, but changed its name when Aristide broke from the party in 1994 and created Fanmi Lavalas. The party has a strong national structure throughout Haiti. Its doctrinaire socialist orientation is a legacy of the late Gerard-Pierre Charles, the party's founder, who became a committed communist while exiled in Mexico during the Duvalier era. Key Leaders: Paul Denis (presidential candidate) Edgar LeBlanc, Jr. (Secretary General, senatorial candidate-Nippes) Rosny Smarth (National Executive, former PM) Suzy Castor (National Executive) ¶4. (SBU) Fusion Party of Social Democrats (FUSION): Fusion formed following a successful merger of smaller parties PANPRA, KONAKOM and Ayiti Kapab in April 2005. OPL and TetAnsanm, both included in the original talks regarding the merger, opted out due to differences in the proposed power-sharing structure (OPL, the largest of the parties involved wanted more influence) and over presidential aspirations of the leadership. According to the party's president, FUSION is represented in 24 of the 30 senatorial races and 84 of the 99 deputy races. The party's president told the Charge November 22 that Fusion is looking to control both houses. He said that if the party could not win a majority, it would work to create a bloc within parliament to work with the president (regardless of the president's party). Benoit had earlier told Poloff November 4 that if the Fusion presidential candidate wins and Fusion has a majority, the party would still have a representative cabinet, offering "5 ministers out of 15" to other parties. Key Leaders: Serge Gilles (presidential candidate) Victor Benoit (President of party) Robert Auguste (Secretary General) Micha Gaillard (spokesperson) ¶5. (U) Union Pour Haiti (UNION): A formal alliance between center-right party MIDH (Movement to Introduce Democracy in Haiti) and the Fanmi Lavalas leadership. Standard bearer Marc Bazin has worked hard to cultivate the Lavalas masses who supported former president Aristide. Bazin is the ultimate survivor of Haitian politics; he served in each successive government beginning with Jean-Claude Duvalier. Key Leaders: Marc Bazin (presidential candidate) Leslie Voltaire (campaign manager) Ivon Feuille (senatorial candidate-South) ¶6. (SBU) Democratic Alliance (Alyans): A formal alliance between populist party Democratic Unity Committee (KID) and the Popular Party for the Renewal of Haiti (PPRH). The party is centered around well-known politician Evans Paul (aka K-Plim, his pseudonym from a radio program in which he told children's stories). Paul, a former mayor of Port-au-Prince, is extremely popular in the capital, but less so in the provinces. Alyans continues to pursue strategic alliances and has been in contact with OPL, Fusion and to a lesser extent PNDPH. Key Leaders: Evans Paul (presidential candidate) Claude Roumain (PPRH national coordinator) On the Right ------------ ¶7. (SBU) National Assembly of Progressive Democrats (RDNP): This is perhaps founder and former president Leslie Manigat's last run for the presidency. RDNP has a strong party infrastructure, however, Manigat's unrelenting hold on the reins of leadership has limited the party's growth. Key Leaders: Leslie Manigat (presidential candidate, former President) Myrlande Manigat (Leslie's spouse and campaign manager; senatorial candidate-West) ¶8. (U) Christian Movement for a New Haiti (MOCHRENHA): Protestant party with regional strength in Gonaives (hometown of the party's founder) and throughout the Artibonite and Central Plateau. Over one thousand supporters crowded a downtown Port-au-Prince basketball gymnasium for MOCHRENHA's October 8 campaign launch. Presidential candidate Luc Mesadieu promised a university in each of the Haiti's ten Departments, increasing the Haitian National Police to 20,000 and bringing back the armed forces of Haiti. This last promise drew the loudest applause. Axan Abellard, of REPONSE, and rejected presidential candidate Osner Fevry (PDCH-II) each spoke in support of Mesadieu's candidacy. Key Leaders: Luc Mesadieu (presidential candidate) Sylvio Dieudonne (senatorial candidate-West) ¶9. (C) Heads Together (Tet Ansanm Originally a regional party with strength in the South, Tet Ansanm gained national notoriety after choosing Haitian-American businessman Dumas Simeus as its presidential candidate. The CEP opted to leave his name off the list of final presidential candidates due to the Nationalities Commission's findings (and ignoring an earlier Haitian supreme court ruling in Simeus' favor) that he holds an American passport. The party is fielding candidates across the board nationally and may form a significant bloc within parliament. The secretary general, a doctor by training and former Aristide Health Minister, likely stifled his own presidential ambitions for a chance at becoming prime minister. Key Leaders: Dumarsais Simeus (disputed presidential candidate) Gerard Blot (Secretary General) New Comers ---------- ¶10. (SBU) Platform for Hope (L'Espwa/L'Espoir): Left-leaning political alliance between ESKAMP (Solidarity to Construct a Popular Alternative), PLB (Open the Gate Party) and KOREGA, a peasants civic organization. The party appears to be strong in the South, Southeast and Grand Anse departments and some cities in the north (ref A). Despite being new on the scene, the party's presidential candidate, former president Rene Preval, appears to be the favorite in the presidential race. Other parties fear that Preval is strong enough to avoid a second round and some have called for parties to consider coalescing around a consensus candidate to challenge the former president (septel). A November 3 march of 3000 Preval supporters was tarnished by some who engaged in minor violence, robbery and vandalism along the route. Key Leaders: Rene Preval (presidential candidate; former President) Bob Manuel (campaign manager, former State Secretary for Public Security) Joseph Jasme (ESKAMP) ¶11. (SBU) Committee to Build Haiti KOMBA: The left-leaning Kombit Pour Bati Ayiti ("Combat") was co-founded in February 2005 by Aristide's Minister of Youth and Sports and a leader of the large rural organization, Mouvement des Paysans de Papaye (MPP, Papaya Peasants Movement). Its strong rural backing makes KOMBA a force to contend with in this year's elections. When the party was founded, many believed it would be the vehicle for former president Rene Preval to launch a bid to reclaim the presidency. To the contrary, however, KOMBA's leadership launched tirades against Preval. Media reported September 30 that KOMBA will back the candidacy of independent Charlito Baker. Baker introduced MPP founder and KOMBA co-founder Jean-Baptiste to the Charge November 22 as Charlito's campaign manager. Key Leaders: Evans Lescouflair Chavannes Jean-Baptiste (MPP) ¶12. (C) Mobilization for Haiti's Progress (MPH): Centrist party founded in November 2004 by Haitian-American and presidential candidate Samir Mourra. Mourra failed to make it onto the final presidential ballot due to his U.S. citizenship. Mourra has pursued the same legal strategy as Dumas Simeus and challenged the ruling before the Supreme Court. The case, pending before the court for over two weeks, is now in perpetual limbo due to the natural death of a supreme court justice November 27 (preventing the court from reaching a quorum and the ability to render a decision on the case). Mourra considers the CEP "corrupt" and alleged interim Prime Minister Latortue played a personal role in the decision to remove Dumas Simeus from the ballot (thereby affecting his own candidacy). Mourra said he would fully support the international community running the elections on behalf of the CEP. MPH is fielding 16 senatorial candidates and 77 deputy candidates. Mourra claims to be self-financing his campaign and the "4000" (including municipal) candidacies of his party. He told PolOff that he has spent more than $500,000 USD (Note: Mourra runs a mortgage company in Miami Lakes where his family still resides. End Note). MPH's philosophy is economics-based and looks to create jobs by concentrating national production on agriculture and attracting foreign direct investment. Key Leaders: Samir Mourra (presidential candidate) Chrisler Elmira (campaign manager) Herve Leveille (party vice president) ¶13. (U) Justice for Peace and National Development (JPDN): Right of center party founded earlier this year by a former Finance Minister who was previously head of the Port-au-Prince bar association. The party was a merger of three smaller defunct parties and 23 civic organizations. The party is actively pro-FADH (former Haitian military). Key Leader: Rigaud Duplan (presidential candidate) ¶14. (SBU) The Front for National Reconstruction (FRN): A FRN publication states the party's main objective is to "contribute to the creation of a modern, developed state, respectful of a democratic order..." FRN is likely to win some seats in local and parliamentary elections, particularly in Gonaives. Guy Phillipe, in the news repeatedly since early last year for his involvement in the events leading up to Aristide's downfall, announced his presidential candidacy on July 4, 2005. For most of the past year, Phillipe has been sounding more moderate in an attempt to erase the image of him as a rebel leader. He applauded the stepped-up vigilance of MINUSTAH and was included amongst political party leaders that met with the UN Security Council here in April. A FRN senatorial candidate once told PolOffs "our economics is on the right; our social policy is on the left." Key Leaders: Guy Phillipe (presidential candidate) Winter Etienne (spokesperson; senatorial candidate-Artibonite) Goodwork Noel (National Executive, member of Preliminary National Dialogue Committee) ¶15. (C) Artibonite in Action (LAAA): This party was founded earlier this year and is based in Gonaives. It is only running candidates in the Artibonite region, the most notable being the interim prime minister's nephew who is running for senate. This party may have nefarious sources of income and has already been implicated in gang-related violence in the poorer neighborhoods of Raboteau and Jubilee in Gonaives. Key Leader: Youri Latortue (senatorial candidate) ¶16. (U) For Us All (PONT): An off-shoot of Fanmi Lavalas. The party was founded in Jacmel and has limited reach beyond the South. Key Leader: Jean-Marie Cherestal (presidential candidate, former PM) KERST
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 001073 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR DRL S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2011 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR ASEC HA SUBJECT: POLICE CHIEF ANDRESOL NOMINATED FOR THREE MORE YEARS Classified By: Ambassador Janet Sanderson for reason 1.4(b). ¶1. (C) President Preval on June 15 announced the nomination of current Haitian National Police (HNP) Director General Mario Andresol to continue in his position for three more years. The Senate must now approve the nomination by majority vote. The justice and security committee will begin examination of his nomination in the coming week. Andresol may face some scrutiny from senate President Joseph Lambert and justice and security committee President Youri Latortue, both of whom are widely believed to be involved in illegal activities. Bolstered by Preval's direct support, however, we expect Andresol to gain Senate approval. ¶2. (C) Since replacing Leon Charles as DG in summer, Andresol has gained the respect of rich and poor alike, as he has attempted to root out corruption within the force, improve performance, and combat a wave of kidnapping that peaked at the end of 2005, but shows signs of resurging. Andresol enjoys the confidence of Robert Manuel, Preval's closest advisor on police and security matters, and Rene Momplaisir, Preval's liaison to the poor masses -- and almost certainly at least some gang leaders -- in Cite Soleil. In cooperation with MINUSTAH political and disarmament officials, Andresol has also quietly entertained feelers from several gang leaders in Cite Soleil and other poor neighborhoods, notably Amaral Duclonat, who have expressed interest in some kind of truce with the HNP. Andresol also collaborated closely with UNPol commissioner Graham Muir in repairing the damage over MINUSTAH's release of an HNP reform plan Haitians regarded as infringement on their sovereignty, and redrafting a reform program that will lead to productive cooperation with UNPol and far-reaching HNP reform. ¶3. (C) Comment. Preval's nomination of Andresol is a significant step forward. Andresol has not only promoted honesty and integrity within the HNP, but has undertaken significant iniiatives, such as the draft HNP rform plan with MINUSTAH, that would have almost ertainly come grinding to a halt without his contnued leadership. We look forward to maintainingour own close bi-lateral cooperation through himand expanding overall multi-lateral coordination as we intensify our efforts to rebuild the HNP. SANDERSON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001407 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR S/CRS SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) WHA/EX PLEASE PASS TO USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS EAID HA SUBJECT: HAITI: A/S SHANNON'S MEETING WITH MINUSTAH SRSG REF: A. PAP 1393 ¶B. PAP 1386 PORT AU PR 00001407 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Edmond Mulet warned A/S Shannon on July 25 that provocations by former president Aristide and his supporters could erode Haiti's post-electoral stability. Mulet said that President Preval's public silence about security problems and inability to decide on a strategy have made it difficult for MINUSTAH to take concrete measures to improve security. Over the long term, Mulet feared Latin troop-contributors' military commitment to Haiti could wane, and he encouraged the U.S. to weigh-in with them in favor of a continued presence. Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on Haiti, saying it would call for a one-year extension of the mandate and a more active MINUSTAH role on justice and security issues. To improve the security situation, Mulet asked the U.S. to expand its drug interdiction efforts in Haiti and ease the U.S. embargo on weapons and ammunition for the Haitian National Police and UN forces. A/S Shannon assured Mulet of strong USG support for MINUSTAH and our eagerness to see its stabilization mission succeed. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon and Ambassador Sanderson, along with A/DCM and WHA/CAR Director Brian Nichols, met for an hour-long conversation with MINUSTAH SRSG Edmond Mulet, on the margins of the July 25 Haiti Donors' Conference. GOH does not Control Provinces - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Mulet described the difficulties facing MINUSTAH and the Haitian government. He rued the "complete lack of the state" in Haiti, especially outside the capital, where the GOH has been unable to enforce the rule of law. For example, he explained that leaders in the northern town of Ouanaminthe have created their own criminal fiefdom. As a result, drug trafficking has become an increasingly alarming problem, which is difficult to combat, in part because of the drug ties within the Haitian Government. In this connection, he mentioned Senate leader Joseph Lambert and Security Commission Chair Youri Latortue -- describing the latter as a "drug dealer." Mulet continued that the judicial system could not impose the rule of law, because the Haitian National Police (HNP) lacked investigation skills and the few judges who have not been corrupted feared ruling against drug-related criminals. Without the basic rule of law, MINUSTAH's progress and development work in Haiti have been severely limited. Aristide Movement Must be Stopped - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Mulet also worried that former president Jean Bertrand Aristide's influence could continue to disrupt government and UN progress in Haiti. Mulet claimed Aristide has sent agents to Haiti to rally support for his return. These instigators have stoked public fear and warned of a new round of violence in Port-au-Prince. Mulet said that at his request, on the margins of last month's African Union summit, UNSYG Annan had urged South African President Mbeki to ensure that Aristide remained in South Africa. Mbeki reportedly replied that Aristide's presence cost the Mbeki government financially through security and housing expenses and prompted significant political criticism from the opposition. Judging Aristide's continued tenure in South Africa uncertain, Mulet urged U.S. legal action against Aristide to prevent the former president from gaining more traction with the Haitian population and returning to Haiti. GOH Unsure on Security - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Mulet said he meets nearly daily with Preval and Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis on the situation in Haiti. Preval frequently has a clear plan of action that he wants MINUSTAH to pursue. However, when MINUSTAH develops operational plans based on Preval's wishes, the President then changes his mind and proposes an entirely different approach. Preval's indecision has left MINUSTAH planners and troops unable to develop a coordinated strategy with the GOH in response to the security situation. Publicly, Preval has accompanied his indecision by complete silence, which is working to erode his government's credibility. Mulet said that when he encouraged Preval to speak out, the President replied that "silence is my best ally." Renewed Mandate to Focus on Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on Haiti, stating that the report would recommend that the Security Council extend MINUSTAH's mandate for one-year and focus its efforts towards security and the rule of law. He continued that he had initially sought an "executive mandate," with greater powers under Chapter VII, the UNSYG had encouraged him to seek a more focused force configuration within the current mandate. To achieve that, Mulet said MINUSTAH planned to add anti-kidnapping experts, Honduran SWAT units, and Peruvian special forces that will allow it to take on gangs and crime directly. Mulet said increased MINUSTAH effectiveness in support of democratic institutions and economic development will hinge on the ability of the donor countries to coordinate their assistance programs. He cited the HNP as an example of the international community's failure to work in concert. Each donor country has pushed its own policing model and donor efforts contradicted one another. Mulet suggested that police donors offer a seminar for the GOH that explains the various policing models and lets the GOH choose. He regretted that the HNP reform plan has been "sitting on the Prime Minister's desk" for about one month, awaiting final signature. Elections Pose Challenge - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) In response to A/S Shannon's query, Mulet said that he opposed holding municipal and legislative elections later this fall. Under the constitution, Haiti must hold up to 11 elections during Preval's term, including runoffs. For example, next year, one-third of the Senate will face election. This will entail a nation-wide vote that will cost an estimated USD 30 million. Mulet added that election of municipal and local governments will lead to a major financial burden on the government, which lacks the resources to sustain such a heavy administrative structure. Mulet has raised these concerns with Preval and suggested that the government amend the constitution to streamline these processes. But, Preval rejected delaying local elections, stressing the importance of municipal and local government to development of the judiciary and electoral council under Haitian law. Preval reportedly did not want to fast track changes in the constitution. Due to a complicated amendment formula, it would take some nine years to effect constitutional change, under the existing rules. MINUSTAH Could Lose Steam Over Long Run - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Over the long-term, Mulet worried that fatigue from MINUSTAH's military and police contributors as well as Venezuela's possible election to the Security Council could jeopardize MINUSTAH's mandate. Mulet explained that though Argentina is committed through February of 2007, it has considered lowering its troop commitment to Haiti. Meanwhile, Chile has already recuperated three helicopters from MINUSTAH, which has significantly limited MINUSTAH's mobility. Mulet reported that the seven South American troop contributors are planning a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Buenos Aires on August 4 to discuss troop levels and the MINUSTAH mandate. In addition, he worried that Venezuela's possible election to the Security Council could jeopardize Haiti's Chapter VII status. Mulet said that the Venezuelan ambassador to Haiti had told him that in Caracas' view Haiti does not require a Chapter VII mission. Possible U.S. Roles - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) Mulet asked for U.S. assistance in a number of areas to help bolster the UN's effort in Haiti. He said that increased U.S. anti-drug efforts south of Hispaniola could disrupt the drug trade and help Haitian authorities regain control in the provinces. He also asked that the USG carve out exceptions for the UN and HNP in its arms embargo against Haiti. While he said that some of the UN military contingents brought their own ammunition with them, many of them need to re-supply from the U.S. Finally, he applauded U.S. efforts to train South American peacekeepers, which he said directly contributed to continued interest by countries such as Bolivia to contribute military contingents to Haiti. A/S Shannon assured Mulet of strong USG support for MINUSTAH and its stabilization role. Shannon offered -- and subsequently followed through (reftels A and B) -- to press Preval and Prime Minister Alexis to take more forceful action on security issues, in close coordination with MINUSTAH. Shannon and Mulet agreed that, if MINUSTAH fails to stabilize Haiti during this period of opportunity, then it is likely the international community will have to return to Haiti with a larger and more costly operation in the future. Comment - - - - ¶10. (C) Mulet is an articulate and focused SRSG who has a good grasp of the challenges facing his mission despite being in his job only seven weeks. His frustration with Preval's inaction and indecision is evident. Mulet clearly wants MINUSTAH to take a more assertive approach to security than his predecessor and should enjoy greater political leeway in Latin capitals to do so in support of a democratically elected government. SANDERSON
“La vraie reconstruction d’Haïti passe par des réformes en profondeur des structures de l’État pour restaurer la confiance, encourager les investisseurs et mettre le peuple au travail. Il faut finir avec cette approche d’un État paternaliste qui tout en refusant de créer le cadre approprié pour le développement des entreprises mendie des millions sur la scène internationale en exhibant la misère du peuple.” Cyrus Sibert